Antislavery and the Isolation of Haiti, 1804-1862*

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Abstract

A growing body of research suggests that ideological cleavages matter for understanding patterns of international conflict. However, we still lack clear evidence that the observed relationship is causal and of the mechanisms responsible for these patterns. To address these gaps, I develop a qualitative case design that draws on the differences-and-differences framework and use it to study British and U.S. reactions to Haitian independence. Before Great Britain outlawed slavery in its colonies, both it and the United States refused to recognize Haiti diplomatically. Yet, after outlawing slavery, British and U.S. foreign policy quickly diverged. Britain ended its regime dispute with Haiti, while the United States continued its policies of isolation until after southern states seceded from the Union. Because these states' material interests did not change at the same time in a way that can account for the observed policy divergence, this case strongly suggests that the antislavery ideals underpinning the Haitian state was the primary source of British and U.s. regime disputes. Moreover, process-tracing reveals that hostilities prior to British and U.S. emancipation were caused by fears that Haitian leaders would promote or otherwise inspire the spread of slave rebellions throughout the Caribbean and U.S. South. Overall then, this research both advances our understanding of the effects of ideological cleavages on international conflict and introduces a new case design to improve researchers' ability to assess causality qualitatively.

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1 Introduction

How and to what extent do ideological considerations motivate states' foreign policy decisions? These questions have regained prominence in recent years as policymakers voice growing concerns that Russia and China – as former Secretary of Defense James Mattis argued – "want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model."[1] For Russia, these allegations are based on its wide-ranging efforts to interfere in U.S. and European elections—both through the direct funding of far-right and far-left populist parties and through sophisticated propaganda campaigns online. For China, these allegations are based on its export of surveillance and censorship technologies to other authoritarian states, as well as Xi Jinping's own rhetoric that China offers a "solution to humanity's search for better social systems."[2] Indeed, only days before stepping down as the National Security Adviser, H.R. McMaster concluded that "we [the United States] are engaged in a fundamental contest between our free and open societies and closed and repressive systems."[3] Yet, many others disagree with these conclusions. At best, opponents argue that branding these countries as "ideological zealots" misdiagnoses the cause of their behavior; at worst, it risks backfiring by turning them precisely into such.[4]

These policy debates echo the larger academic literature on ideology and international conflict and underscore that the relationship between the two is still not well-understood. While a growing body of research demonstrates that pairs of states that share an ideology – and not just pairs of liberal democracies – experience lower rates of conflict than states that do not share an ideology, we know little about why this is the case.[5] To some, the observed relationship is likely spurious. Realists, for instance, have long argued that foreign policy behavior might appear ideologically-driven because leaders use such rhetoric to disguise their pursuit of power and other material interests.[6] Further, because changes in

[1] James Mattis' Resignation Letter, December 21, 2018, Full text available at https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/politics/james-mattis-resignation-letter-doc/index.html.

[2] Quoted in Weiss, Jessica Chen (2019), "A World Safe for Autocracy: China's Rise and the Future of Global Politics," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 98 (2019), pg. 92.

[3] H.R. McMaster's Remarks to the Atlantic Council, April 3, 2018, Full text available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/us-national-security-advisor-lt-gen-h-r-mcmaster-russian-aggression-is-strengthening-our-resolve/.

[4] For an argument against branding China as an "ideological zealot," see Weiss, "A World Safe for Autocracy." For works assessing Russian motivations in its recent foreign policy actions, see John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 93 (2014), pg. 77-89.

[5] For qualitative evidence of these patterns, see Mark Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) and John Owen, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). For quantitative evidence of each a liberal, Marxist, and monarchical peace, see Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict."

[6] See, for example, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, NY: Alfred Knopf Inc., 1948); Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interests: Raw Material*

states' ideologies often are the result of domestic revolutions, states' conflict behavior might be better explained by other effects of revolutions, such as the creation of windows of opportunity,[7] diversionary incentives facing unstable governments,[8] or the introduction of new foreign policy preferences with new regimes.[9]

Even among scholars persuaded that "ideology matters," there is little consensus on the mechanisms responsible for the relationship. Existing work mentions at least five possible pathways through which ideological differences can increase the risk of international conflict, but it has not assessed their empirical importance against alternative explanations.[10]

In this article, I conduct an in-depth case study of British and U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti following its independence in 1804, both to better assess the causal effect of states' ideologies on conflict and to document the mechanisms through which ideological considerations operate. The Haitian Revolution, which began in August 1791 and lasted for 13 years, lead to the creation of the first state to be formed by ex-slaves. As such, the Haitian regime posed an ideological threat to slave-holding societies. Its existence not only defied assumptions about racial hierarchies upon which the institution rested; it also demonstrated to slaves and slaveholders alike that the continuation of slavery need not depend on the decisions of whites.[11]

Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001).

[7]See, for example, Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and Alex Weisiger, Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

[8]On diversionary incentives, see George Downs and David Rocke, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 38, No. 2 (1994), pg. 362-380; Walt, *Revolutions and War*; Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is war still ex post inefficient?," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 48, no. 3 (2004), pg. 604-619; Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, *Leaders and International Conflict* (Camrbdige, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Alexandre Debs and Hein Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, no. 3 (2010), pg. 430-445.

[9]See Zeev Maoz, *Domestic Sources of Global Change* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Jeff Colgan, "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict," *World Politics* 65, No. 4 (2013), pg. 656-690; Jeff Colgan and Jessica Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict," *International Organization* Vol. 69, No. 1 (2015), pg. 163-194.

[10]These mechanisms will be discussed in detail below.

[11]For historian's take on the ideological threat Haiti posed to the practice of slavery, see Ada Ferrer, "Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic," *American Historical Review* Vol. 117, No. 1 (2012), pg. 40-66; David Brion Davis, "The Impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions," in David Geggus, ed., *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Columbia, SC, 2001), pg. 3-9; Seymour Drescher, "The Limits of Example," Ibid, pg. 10-14; Robin Blackburn, "The Force of Example," ibid., pg. 15-20; Ashli White, *Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic* (John Hopkins University Press, 2010); and Brenda Gayle Pummer, *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment* (Atlanta, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992).

Drawing on a difference-in-differences framework, I document the changes in British foreign policy towards Haiti before and after it ended slavery in its colonies and compare these changes to the stability of U.S. foreign policy during the same time period. This type of design improves on more common between- and within-case approaches by limiting the threat of confounding variables to only those that change alongside British emancipation but do not also change for the United States.[12] Further, because emancipation is not the product of domestic revolution, the case allows us to isolate the effect of Britain's ideological incompatibility with the Haitian regime independent of processes associated with revolutionary change.

This analysis yields two key insights. First, the case provides strong evidence that the ideological threat Haiti posed towards the institution of slavery was the primary source of Britain's and the United States' disputes with the Haitian regime. In particular, before Great Britain ended slavery in its colonies, both it and the United States refused to recognize Haiti diplomatically and sought to limit exchange with the island nation. Yet, after outlawing slavery, British and U.S. foreign policy quickly diverged. Great Britain ended its regime dispute with Haiti, deepened its economic links with the country, and even began cooperating with Haitian leaders to police the Atlantic slave trade. The United States, on the other hand, continued its policies of exclusion until 1862, after southern states had seceded from the Union. Because these states' material interests did not change at the same time in a way that can account for this policy divergence, it is unlikely that the observed relationship between ideological cleavages and the presence of regime disputes is spurious.

Second, the case illustrates how ideological differences between states can generate conflict, even in the absence of strong normative commitments to promoting one's ideology abroad. Process-tracing reveals that a primary reason British and U.S. leaders opposed the Haitian regime was that they believed the very existence of a state born of slave rebellion and legitimated explicitly on anti-slavery ideals would inspire similar slave revolts in their own territory. On top of this, the fear that Haitians held ideologically-revisionist preferences featured prominently in British and U.S. foreign policy decisions, even though there is little evidence that Haitian leaders sought to spread slave rebellions to the British colonies or the United States.

This latter mechanism – the fear of ideologically-revisionist preferences – produced international conflict through dynamics similar to those of the classical security dilemma.[13]

[12] For estimation of causal effects under a difference-in-difference approach, see Joshua Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pg. 227-242.

[13] For prominent works on the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pg. 167-214; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pg. 62-76; Charles Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), pg. 171-201; Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

But whereas in the standard case conflict is driven by uncertainty over the other states' territorial revisionism, here the uncertainty was about Haitian leaders' willingness and ability to prevent the export of their ideology.[14] The case is less consistent with other mechanisms theorized to link ideological differences to conflict, including the creation of in-groups and out-groups, a fundamental inability to communicate, or the use of ideological subversion to revise the international balance of power to be more favorable.

This paper proceeds in seven parts. In the next section, I briefly review the debates in the existing literature on ideology and international conflict, as well as highlight the challenges of assessing the causal effect of ideological differences between states. The third section describes the research design I employ, including details on case selection, the objectives of a case study that approximates a difference-in-differences design, and how this research contributes to our understanding of relationship between ideology and international conflict. In the fourth and fifth sections, I document the similarity of British and U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti prior to British emancipation and the divergence of their foreign policies afterwards. I also use process-tracing to show how ideological differences influenced leaders' foreign policy decisions. I then address potential threats to inference in the sixth section, including alternative explanations and whether the observed behavior is an example of reversed causality. Finally, I take stock of the major findings of the previous sections and highlight future directions for research on these topics in the conclusion.

2 Ideology and International Conflict

In this study, I use ideology to refer to the sets of ideas that governments use to legitimate their rule domestically. These principles help dictate how much authority a government should have over society, who in society is able to participate, and the ends towards which government action is designed. As Heyward explains, "[b]y providing society with a unified political culture, political ideas help promote order and stability."[15] This conception is similar to other definitions of ideology used in investigations of the link ideological ties and international conflict.[16] Importantly, I do not use the word ideology to refer broadly to individual's bundles of political preferences. I also do not use ideology to refer to the-

[14] In *Revolutions and War*, Walt makes a similar point in arguing that ideological differences can exacerbate the security dilemma. However, Walt attributes the fear of ideological-revisionism as more similar to a fleeting paranoia that arises in the immediate aftermath of revolution and should dissipate quickly. See Walt, *Revolutions and War*, pg. 33, 39.

[15] Andrew Heyward, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, (New York, NK: Palgrave McMillan Press, 2007), pg. 3.

[16] For instance, Haas defines ideology as "the principles upon which a particular leadership group attempts to legitimate its claim to rule and the primary institutional, economic, and social goals to which it swears allegiance." See Haas, *The Ideological Origins* pg. 5.

ories of foreign policy, such as imperialism[17] or those ascribed to particular leaders, like Jeffersonianism or Wilsonianism.[18]

The first major body of work suggestive of a relationship between ideology and international conflict is the literature on the democratic peace. Specifically, scholars have documented a robust empirical finding that liberal democracies rarely go to war with other liberal democracies.[19] While much research attributes this peace to the presence of institutional constraints,[20] there are significant strands that emphasize the effect of sharing a liberal ideology.[21] These arguments tend to highlight the content of liberal ideology, suggesting that it is liberalism's normative commitments to equality, consent, and non-violent dispute resolution that matter. Liberal states are both more likely to form security communities together and to avoid conflict with one another because they externalize these pacific norms in their relationships.[22] Others argue that commitments to a liberal ideology can motivate states to attempt to convert autocratic regimes into democratic ones, in a so-called "democratic crusade."[23]

[17]Jack Snyder, *Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

[18]See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2002).

[19]Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 18, No. 4 (1988), pg. 653-673.

[20]For a few prominent examples of this type of work, see David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 86, No. 1 (1992), pg. 24-37; James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pg. 577-592; Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Marrow, Randolph Silverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 93, No. 4 (1999), pg. 791-807; and Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, *Democracies at War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[21]For prominent examples in this strand of democratic peace research, see Michael Doyle (1986), "Liberalism and *World Politics*," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 80, No. 4 (1986), pgs. 1151-1169; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* Vo. 87, No. 3 (1993), pg. 624-638; John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," *International Security* Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 87-125; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Security*, Peter Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[22]Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Political Writings*, Ed. Hans Reiss, (HB Nisbet, Translation Cambridge University Press, 1970); Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North American Area*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Doyle, "Liberalism in *World Politics*"; Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO."

[23]For arguments on the democratic crusade, see Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace"; Charles Kegley Jr. and Margaret Hermann, "Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace: A Research Note," *Comparative Political Studies* Vol. 30, No. 1, pg. 78-107; Margaret Hermann and Charles Kegley Jr., "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record," *International Interactions* Vol. 24, No. 2 (1998), pg. 91-114; and Michael Desch, "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign policy," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2008), pg. 7-43. Meanwhile, the evidence on whether efforts to forcibly democratize other countries succeed in making targeted states more democratic is mixed. See Mark Peceny, *Democracy at*

Recent work by Haas, Owen, and Hundley, however, makes a more general case for the effect of ideological ties between states.[24] Moving beyond the content of specific ideologies, each of these authors argue that states that legitimate their rule according to similar principles are less likely to conflict with each other than pairs of countries with opposing ideologies. Haas and Owen reach these conclusions by conducting impressive historical surveys that illustrate that – at least since the French Revolution – clashes between different political ideologies have been a driving force of international conflict.[25] Hundley provides some of the first quantitative evidence of an ideological peace beyond pairs of liberal states. She shows that between 1946 and 2010 pairs of liberal democracies, Marxist regimes, and monarchies were less likely to conflict with one another than other pairs of states. Importantly, Hundley demonstrates that these patterns only hold for disputes over the regimes of other countries, as opposed to conflicts over territory.

While these works demonstrate, in different ways, an empirical relationship between ideological dissimilarity and an increased rate of regime disputes, there is no consensus on why this relationship exists. Existing work has hypothesized at least five different theoretical mechanisms to account for the observed patterns. First, ideological cleavages may serve as a natural division for forming in-groups versus out-groups. Drawing on research in social psychology that demonstrates people tend to view members of their in-group favorably and members of their outgroup with hostility, this mechanisms suggests that relations between countries with different ideologies are naturally more antagonistic and characterized by distrust.[26] Second, states with different ideologies may face more challenges to effective communication. Because states without a common ideology also lack the common understandings of language, symbols, and reference points necessary for effective communication, they are also more likely interpret each other's actions in the worst light. When disagreements between ideological competitors arise then, it is less likely that they will be able to resolve these differences without resorting to violence.[27]

Third, there may be a higher rate of conflict among those that are ideologically disparate

the Point of Bayonets (Penn State Press, 1999); Andrew Enterline and J. Michael Greig, "Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy on Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (2005), pg. 1075-1098; Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, "Forging Democracy at Gunpoint," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006), pg. 539-559; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2006), pg. 627-649; Andrew Enterline and J. Michael Greig, "Against All Odds? The History of Imposed Democracy and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2008): pg. 321-347; and Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pg. 90-131.

[24] See Haas, *The Ideological Origins* Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*; and Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict."

[25] Owen starts his analysis even earlier, beginning with conflicts between Protestantism and Catholicism in different European principalities. See Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*.

[26] See Haas, *The Ideological Origins* pg. 9-12.

[27] Ibid., pg. 12-14.

because states promote their ideology abroad in order to revise the international balance of power in their favor. This mechanism assumes that states with similar ideologies are more likely to have similar foreign policy preferences. If true, then states would face strategic incentives to overturn ideological others in order to extract favorable foreign policy concessions or turn adversaries into allies. Owen argues these incentives are particular strong during periods of transnational ideological polarization – that is, when elites across countries are increasingly at odds over the appropriate models of governance.[28] Importantly, ideology matters here because it is a source of a states' alignment preferences.

Fourth, leaders may have normative preferences for promoting their ideology abroad. While acting on such preferences would necessarily bring countries into conflict with those they do not share an ideology, genuine normative commitments for ideological activism are not necessary for conflict to occur between ideologically-dissimilar states. Akin to the security dilemma – in which two non-revisionist states may nevertheless engage in territorial expansion – ideologically-dissimilar states may seek to subvert each other out of the fear that the other has ideologically-revisionist preferences.[29] It is also difficult for disparate states to credibly signal that they do not have such preferences. Even if ideologically-disparate states have not currently taken actions to subvert one another, there is little to guarantee that leaders would not support domestic challengers that they are more ideologically-sympathetic to if the opportunity arose.[30]

Finally, ideologically-disparate states might conflict with one another out of the fear of demonstration effects from each other's success. Several studies show that revolutions and other political upheavals tend to spread across borders, and these demonstration effects are often ideological in nature.[31] States may therefore seek to undermine ideologically-opposed

[28] Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, pg. 45-46.

[29] Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict." For work on the classical security dilemma, see Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*; Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited"; and Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*. Walt also suggests that in the aftermath of revolutions, leaders might rely on others' ideologies for cues of their foreign policy preferences. This creates an opportunity for ideological differences to exacerbate spirals of suspicion by increasing fears that other states are ideologically-expansionist, but this dynamic should be short-lived as states learn more about each other's "true" intentions. See Walt, *Revolutions and War*, pg. 36, 39.

[30] This dynamic – that states may instead be opportunistic – suggests that efforts to signal via restraint will be less effective. For more signaling via restraint, see Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2000), pg. 325-357.

[31] For selected research on the contagion of regime contention, see Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008), pg. 215-233; Kurt Weyland, "The Diffusion of Revolution: '1848' in Europe and Latin America," *International Organization* Vol. 63, No. 3 (2009), pg. 391-423; Henry Hale, "Regime Change Cascades: What we Have Learned From the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 16 (2017), pg. 331-352; Barbara Wejnert, *Diffusion of Democracy: The Past and Future of Global Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Kristian Gleditsch and Mauricio Rivera, "The Diffusion of Nonviolent Campaigns," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pg. 479-506.

regimes to remove the threat of contagion at its source.[32] Even if a state is unlikely to successfully overthrow another's government, they may still seek to fuel unrest in their ideological competitors in order to make the targeted regimes less appealing models for domestic audiences to try to replicate.[33]

Others argue that the apparent relationship between ideological cleavages and international conflict is spurious. Realist scholars, for instance, have long been skeptical of any genuine effect of ideology on states' foreign policies, suggesting that leaders often use ideological rhetoric to disguise their pursuit of power and other material interests.[34] Similarly, much of the research on subversion suggests that states intervene against their adversaries to extract favorable (but unspecified) foreign policy concessions.[35] These scholars would likely argue that the finding that pairs of liberal democracies and pairs of communist states were overall more cooperative is both obvious and incorrectly attributing an effect to ideology—that the observed pattern is instead the result of a bipolar competition that would have occurred even without the ideological differences between the United States and Soviet Union.[36] While those that argue in favor of ideological effects address these types of critiques in their analyses, it is difficult to gauge how potential omitted variables are affecting their results without an in-depth examination of a particular case or fine-grained data to capture them.[37]

Another factor that makes it difficult to determine what conclusions to draw from the observed correlations between ideology and conflict is that ideological shifts often occur in the context of domestic revolutions. Several studies have shown that revolutionary governments appear especially likely to engage in conflicts with others – perhaps because revolutions create new windows of opportunity for outside states to pursue old disputes,[38] because un-

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[32]See Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict"; Haas, *The Ideological Origins*; and Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*.

[33]Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict."

[34]See Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*; Walt, *Origins of Alliances*; and Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[35]For selected examples of work in this vein, see Navin Bapit, "Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pg. 1-29; Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, "Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946-2001," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pg. 720-734; Johannes Bubeck and Nickolay Marinov, "Process of Candidate: The International Community and the Demand for Electoral Integrity," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 111, No. 3, pg. 535-554; and Melissa Lee, "The International Politics of Incomplete Sovereignty: How Hostile Neighbors Weaken the State," *International Organization*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (2018), pg. 283-315.

[36]Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pg. 511-522; Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (1997), pg. 393-417.

[37]For instance, even though Hundley demonstrates that the results on shared ideology still hold when controlling for common measures of shared versus conflicting foreign policy interests, some argue that these measures are unable to adequately capture these preferences very well. James Fearon and Bertel Hansen, "The Arms Trade, International Alignments, and International Conflict," (2018).

[38]Walt, *Revolutions and War*; Weisiger, *Logics of War*.

stable governments face incentives to launch diversionary attacks,[39] or because revolutions bring new preferences to power and in doing so, creates new conflicts of interests with outsiders.[40] While these works do not make clear predictions about which states revolutionary governments are likely to come in conflict with, it is possible that these dynamics are partly responsible for the observed correlations between ideological similarity and diminished hostilities.[41]

Importantly, theories that suggest revolutions increase the likelihood of conflict and theories that emphasize the importance of ideological ties are not necessarily competitive with one another. For instance, revolutions can increase the risk of conflict by bringing new preferences to power and those preferences may often be ideological in nature. Ideology, in this case, would help us make better predictions about which states a revolutionary government's relations are likely to improve or worsen. It could similarly be the case that ideological competitors make particularly attractive targets for diversionary attacks – although this argument offers a mechanism that is slightly different than those identified in existing work. Finally, it is possible that revolutions increase the risk of conflict because the potential for demonstration effects is highest following the collapse of an ideologically-similar government. In either case, we would ideally like to identify a research design that would enable us to assess the extent to which the relation between ideology and conflict is due to mechanics associated with revolution independent of ideology, those associated with ideology independent of a revolution, and those associated with the interaction of these two factors.

Overall then, while existing research documents a strong correlation between shared ideological ties and a reduction of regime-related hostilities, we lack clear evidence that this relationship is not spurious or of the proposed mechanisms. This study is intended to fill this gap. In the next section, I explain how examining British and U.S. foreign policies towards Haiti can help us better assess whether there is a causal relationship between dissimilar ideologies and interstate conflict and which theoretical mechanisms may be responsible for the association.

[39] Downs and Rocke, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Ressurection"; Walt, *Revolutions and War*; Chiozza and Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders"; Chiozza and Goemans, *Leaders and International Conflict*; and Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War."

[40] Maoz, Domestic Sources; Colgan, "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders"; Colgan and Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict."

[41] Walt's *Revolution and War* is a notable exception here, predicting that conflict in the aftermath of revolution may be likely between ideological competitors. Again, however, in Walt's analysis, the relationship between ideology and increased hostilities is only likely to arise in the short-lived aftermath of revolution because states do not have other information to rely on to assess one another's foreign policy preferences.

3 Research Design

This study uses original archival evidence to trace British and U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti, starting with the formation of Haiti as an independent state in 1804 through British and U.S. emancipation.[42] Drawing on a difference-in-differences framework, I exploit British emancipation in 1838 to assess the causal effect of ideological cleavages on the presence or absence of regime disputes between states. I also incorporate process-tracing to examine how ideological compatibility versus incompatibility with Haiti shaped British and U.S. policies towards the Caribbean nation. As such, this study addresses concerns that the correlations between ideology and conflict documented in previous work are spurious and provides evidence of the mechanism linking these two factors together.

There are four primary reasons I selected this case. First, and most importantly, the case permits both the between case and over time comparisons necessary for a difference-in-difference research design which, as I elaborate on below, enables me to better assess the causal effect of ideological ties between states. Second, because the change in Britain's stance on slavery was not the product of a domestic revolution, the case allows me to isolate the effect of the ideological shift from other mechanisms associated with revolutionary change. So, unlike many changes in states' ideologies, emancipation does not automatically introduce other potential confounders into the case. For instance, emancipation did not create a temporary shock to the balance of power between Britain and its adversaries; it did not make the British government unstable domestically; and it did not change Britain's larger governing institutions. Therefore, any observed changes in Britain's foreign policy following emancipation cannot be explained by arguments about the creation of windows of opportunity, diversionary incentives, or changes in the degree of Britain's institutional constraints.

Third, the case offers a high level of access to evidence on the British and U.S. decision-making process as much of it took place through written correspondence. Letters between government officials – such as those between local governors and the British Home Office, between members of the U.S. presidential administrations, etc. – contain explicit instructions for executing different policy decisions and justifications for these decisions. Moreover, because these letters were not written for public consumption (or with the knowledge that they would be made public in the future), they also often contain more candid commentary by authors on their motivations and their assessments of others' motivations for behavior than what is available for more contemporary cases. Finally, I also selected this case because Haiti – and the greater Caribbean – is understudied in the IR literature.[43] While there is

[42]Most primary source documents used in this study are housed in the Library of Congress and the National Archives in the United Kingdom.

[43]No existing study of the relationship between ideology and international conflict has examined the Haitian case, and selecting cases outside of more heavily studied regions is important for testing how far a theory travels.

significant research highlighting the salience of slavery for both domestic and foreign policy outcomes, IR scholars have yet to study the Haitian Revolution.[44]

With a difference-in-differences approach, researchers seek to assess the causal effect of some variable of interest by comparing the behavior of a unit that underwent a change in that variable (i.e. "received the treatment") to a unit that did not undergo such a change (i.e. "the control"). If both units behaved similarly prior to treatment (i.e. followed "parallel trends"), then the behavior of the control unit post-treatment can help us approximate what the treated unit's behavior would have been had it not received the treatment.[45] These types of designs have been adopted widely in quantitative social science literature, but they have not crossed over into qualitative studies.[46] However, the intuition underlying the difference-in-differences approach can be easily adapted for qualitative studies as well.[47]

In this study, I use British emancipation of slavery in 1838 as the primary "treatment" to draw inferences about the causal effect of ideological cleavages on the relations between states. From 1804 through 1838, Haiti's anti-slavery ideals clashed directly with Great Britain's and the United States' reliance on slavery. When slavery formally came to an end in the British colonies, Britain's ideological incompatibility with Haiti also ended. Because the United States does not undergo emancipation until the 1860s, we can use U.S. relations with Haiti after 1838 to approximate what British relations would have looked like if it had not outlawed slavery in its colonies – provided that British and U.S. relations followed "parallel trends" up until British emancipation.

[44]For works in political science on the salience of slavery for domestic policy, see Avidit Acharya, Matthew Blackwell, and Maya Sen, "The Political Legacy of American Slavery," *Journal of Politics* Vol. 78, No. 3 (2016): pg. 621-641; ibid, *Deep Roots: How Slavery Still Shapes Southern Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and Andrew Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki, "Wealth, Slave Ownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy: An Empirical Study of the American Civil War," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 113, No. 3 (2019), pg. 658-673. For works on the salience of slavery for foreign policy, see Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade," *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, pg. 631-688; and Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), especially pages 52-72.

[45]For estimation of causal effects with this approach, see Angrist and Pishke, *Mostly Harmless*, pg. 227-242.

[46]For selected social science applications of difference-in-differences designs, see David Card and Alan Krueger, "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania," *American Economic Review* Vol. 84, No. 4, pg. 772-793; Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 53, No. 3, pg. 331-361; and Michael Bechtel and Jens Hainmueller, "How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 55, No. 4, pg. 852-868.

[47]While this technique was popularized in economics research in the 20th century, the logic was used in social science research much earlier. For instance, John Snow's famous cholera study conducted in the 1850s has a difference-in-differences design. For the story of John Snow's research, see Steven Johnson, *The Ghost Map: The Story of London's Most Terrifying Epidemic—And How it Changed Science, Cities, and the Modern World*, (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006).

It is worth interrogating how a state's stance on slavery fits the criteria for being an ideology. For the Haitian government, there can be no doubt that anti-slavery was the cornerstone of its domestic legitimation strategy. The revolution itself had been fundamentally a revolt against the institution, and the principles of anti-slavery continued to define the Haitian state that emerged afterwards. The second article of the 1805 Constitution, for instance, proclaimed *"L'esclavage est à jamais aboli,"* or "slavery is forever abolished."[48] According to historian Julia Gaffield, Haiti's founding documents – including its constitution and its Declaration of Independence – relied on the prevention of re-enslavement as a central pillar for the authority of the government. As the central goal of government action, it justified the expansion of state power at the expense of individual liberty as well as the increasing militarization of society.[49]

As for Great Britain and the United States, it would be inappropriate to claim these governments legitimated their rule solely based on whether they permitted human bondage. However, it would also be inappropriate to denigrate a state's position on slavery as a simple "policy decision." Slavery was a cornerstone of both the British and U.S. economic systems, which means it was – at minimum – a defining institution of both states' character. But more than that, the legitimacy of the U.S. federal government and British colonial rule did rest on the creation and maintenance of a political system in which slavery could lawfully exist. For the United States, this is evident in founding documents like in the Constitution, which included provisions that detailed how slaves should be counted for the purposes of taxation and representation as well as those that legally required escaped slaves to be returned to their masters.[50] Likewise, the British colonies recognized the authority of the British government based on its commitments to respect their rights to regulate their internal affairs.[51] So,

[48] There is even an article in this constitution that states "No white man, whatever his nation, will set foot on this territory, as master or owner, and will in future be able to acquire no property there" (Aucun blanc, quelle que soit sa nation, ne mettra le pied sur ce territoire, à titre de maître ou de propriétaire et ne pourra à l'avenir y acquérir aucune propriété). Subsequent constitutions included similar statements about slavery as well. Webster University, "The 1805 Constitution of Hayti," Bob Corbett, http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/1805-const.htm, Accessed February 21, 2020.

[49] Julia Gaffield, *Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pg. 186-187.

[50] There exists some debate today over whether the Constitution sanctioned slavery, much akin to debates over whether the American Civil war was about slavery or "states' rights." While the Constitution does not explicitly authorize slavery, it certainly allowed it to exist under state law. Further, provisions like the fugitive slave clause and the three-fifths compromise empowered slave-holding elites and others that sought to strengthen the institution. For examples of this debate, see Sean Wilentz, "Constitutionally, Slavery Is No National institution," *New York Times,* September 16th, 2015, Available At https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/constitutionally-slavery-is-no-national-institution.html; and David Waldstreicher, "How the Constitution Was Indeed Pro-Slavery," *The Atlantic,* September 19th, 2015, Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/how-the-constitution-was-indeed-pro-slavery/406288/.

[51] David Murray, *The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government, 1802-1834* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pg. 46, 144, and 204.

even though slavery was not legal in the British Isles, the government was bound to respect slavery's existence as it was protected by positive law in the colonies.[52] One of the primary obstacles facing British abolition, as documented by historian Barry Higman, was getting buy in from the colonial legislatures, as it was not universally recognized that abolition was within the scope of the authority of British parliament.[53]

More broadly, if ideologies are "particular visions for ordering domestic politics,"[54] then the willingness to allow large swaths of the population to be enslaved does seem to be a critical part of this vision. At the very least, Haiti posed an ideological threat to Great Britain's and the United States' reliance on slavery. As Tim Matthewson argues, "the slave revolution was an ideological threat, an example of slaves successfully displacing their masters."[55]

If ideological cleavages increase the risk of regime disputes, then we would expect to observe three patterns. First, before British emancipation, we would expect both Great Britain and the United States to have a regime dispute with Haiti. Second, we would expect Great Britain and Haiti to resolve its regime dispute once the British formally ended slavery in its colonies in 1838. Finally, we would expect the United States and Haiti to continue to have a regime dispute in the period following British emancipation until it also ended slavery. To put it differently, if British relations with Haiti improve following emancipation, we can be more confident that the change in relations are due to the resolution of Britain and Haiti's ideological incompatibility if we do not observe a similar change in U.S. relations with Haiti at this time.

There are several indicators one might use to measure the existence of a regime dispute between states. As Hundley (2020) explains, a regime dispute exists if one state seeks to change the leadership or political institutions of another country. One indicator for the existence of a regime dispute is direct interference in another country towards these ends or the provision of aid to groups seeking these ends. For instance, launching a war of regime change, providing support to rebel groups in civil war, encouraging coups, or interfering in elections all indicate the presence of a regime dispute. However, regime disputes are not always "hot." Ideally, we want to know when a government desires regime change in another

[52] There was no coherent slave code developed in Great Britian, and as a result, laws regarding slavery were often at odds with one another. Indeed, while the famous case of Somerset vs. Stewart was understood at the time as saying slavery was illegal in Great Britain, what Lord Mansfield actually ruled was that slavery did not exist in Britain under common law. In other words, slavery could not be recognized without positive laws legalizing the institution. This meant that British government recognized slavery in its colonies since colonial legislatures had developed positive laws authorizing the institution, but not in the British Isles where no such statues existed. For more, see William Wiecek, "Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1974), pg. 86-146.

[53] Barry W. Higman, "The West India 'Interest' in Parliament, 1807-1833," *Australian Historical Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 49 (1967), pg. 1-19.

[54] Haas, *The Ideological Origins* pg. 5.

[55] Tim Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 140, No. 1 (1996), pg. 33.

country, even if it is not actively interfering towards those ends.[56] So, a second indicator we can use for the existence of a regime dispute is whether a government has made explicit statement or otherwise indicated in official policy that it desires a change in the leadership or institutions of another country.

In this study, I use withholding diplomatic recognition as my primary indicator of the existence of a regime dispute between Great Britain and Haiti or between the United States and Haiti. I explain in more detail below that nonrecognition marked that Great Britain and the United States consented to any attempt by France to reclaim its former colony. But more broadly, withholding diplomatic recognition is one type of policy that enshrines disapproval of a country's government. Woodrow Wilson, for example, refused to recognize the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica because he came to power via a coup against a democratically-elected leader. Similarly, Donald Trump withdrew diplomatic recognition of Nicolas Maduro's regime in Venezuela in 2019, choosing instead to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaido. Of course, states may also have regime disputes with governments that they diplomatically recognize, but to note the existence of such a dispute, we would need to observe other explicit claims against the regime or the active policies of regime change described above.

There are two distinct advantages of designing the case based on a difference-in-differences approach. First, it helps minimize bias when comparing UK-Haiti relations after British emancipation to US-Haiti relations that are the result of "permanent," baseline differences in the two sets of bilateral relationships. For example, we may think that the United Kingdom would be overall less hostile to Haitians due to a greater geographic distance between the two. If we only compared U.S. and British relations to Haiti after British emancipation, for instance, we might incorrectly infer that the British having better relations with Haiti was a result of ideological similarity on the issue of slavery, while in reality the difference may simply be explained by geographic proximity. Other case designs – like "most similar" or "most different" designs – can also minimize these potential biases. However, unlike these designs, a difference-in-differences approach does not restrict case selection to only those that are similar (or are different) on all potential confounders.

Second, a difference-in-differences approach also helps minimize bias when comparing UK-Haiti relations before and after emancipation by "controlling for" other temporal trends that would have affected both UK and US relations. For example, relations between France and Haiti greatly improved between 1825 and 1838, and it is possible that the United Kingdom would be hesitant to recognize Haiti diplomatically when France still claimed de jure sovereignty over its former colony.[57] If we only examined British-Haitian relations before

[56] This is similar to the distinction made in the literature on territorial disputes. States with conflicting territorial claims are said to have a territorial dispute, even when these states are not engaged in active military conflict over the disputed territory. For an in-depth discussion of territorial disputes and the different stages of the escalation process, see Paul Huth and Todd Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pg. 34-55.

[57] Notably, lack of recognition by a former metropole did not prevent Britain from recognizing several coun-

and after its emancipation, then, it would be difficult to know whether any improvement in relations resulted from its ideological shift or due to French recognition. However, because U.S. and U.K. relations with Haiti were likely complicated in similar ways by France's own relationship with its former colony, we can be more confident that the ideological shift in the UK regarding emancipation affected its own decision to recognize Haiti since the United States continued its isolationist policies towards Haiti. In other words, by combining over-time analyses with between-case comparisons, a difference-in-differences approach can provide researchers with a benchmark for judging whether the observed change in the treated unit's behavior is meaningful.

For a differences-in-differences approach to be credible, there are a few conditions that need to be satisfied. Most critically, we need to establish that Haiti's relations with Great Britain and with the United States followed "parallel trends" prior to emancipation in Britain. This does not require that British and U.S. foreign policy be nearly identical: because there are other factors that differ between Britain and the United States that likely affect their policy decisions, we would expect some baseline differences in their relations with Haiti. What is important is that the two countries are not reacting in opposite ways to different developments in Haiti. Moreover, because treatment is not randomly assigned, we also need to show that the emancipation of slavery is not endogenous to our outcome of interest. In other words, we need to show that British emancipation was not caused by Britain having better relations with Haiti in the first place. We also need to show that there is not an unmeasured variable is not independently causing British emancipation and its recognition of Haiti to occur around the same time. Finally, we need to check whether other factors that could affect Britain's relations with Haiti were changing at the same time as emancipation. If other variables of interest are changing, then we should provide evidence that they were changing in a way that would not predict an improvement in Britain-Haiti relations.

4 Establishing Parallel Paths of British and U.S. Isolation of Haiti

On January 1st, 1804, General-in-Chief Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared Haiti's independence from France. This declaration marked the end of a 13-year political conflict that started in August 1791, when slaves in the northern plains of Haiti rose up in rebellion against their condition of human bondage. Slavery in the French colony had been remarkably brutal. At the outset of the Revolution, there were over 450,000 slaves in Haiti, which meant that a "territory roughly the size of Maryland had two thirds the number of slaves

tries in Latin America. Britain recognized Brazil a year before Portugal did so. It also recognized Mexico, Gran Colombia, and Rio de la Plata in 1825, over a year before Spain had recognized the independence of any of its former colonies. See William Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations by the United States," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, pg. 239-269.

who lived in the entire United States at the time."[58] Nearly 5% of them died every year.[59] The fight for their freedom had also been brutal. Before ceding defeat in November 1803, Napoleon's armies undertook a series of mass killings—often with the use of hunting dogs, or by mass drownings or mass immolations—against the black and colored populations on the island.[60] Yet, despite these gruesome acts of violence, the Haitian Revolutionaries emerged victorious. In declaring independence, Dessalines announced to the world the formation of the first state in history that was both free from slavery and whose leadership was comprised of former captives.

In this section, I document the processes that lead Great Britain and the United States to pursue largely parallel policies towards Haiti. Rather than recognize Haitian sovereignty, both Great Britain and the United States pursued policies of diplomatic and economic isolation that were designed to leave Haiti's status as an independent state as precarious as possible. I also show that these choices were driven by fears that Haitian leaders had regime-revisionist preferences and by fears of demonstration effects more broadly. In particular, Great Britain abandoned its initial attempts to enter formal economic relations with the Haitian regime after Dessalines refused to relinquish their rights to maritime navigation and orchestrated a series of massacres against the white population. These acts, in effect, rendered Dessalines' assurances of a friendly disposition non-credible.[61] The United States originally went further to restrict trade with the Haitians following the massacres and after a number of domestic slave plots had consumed the U.S. South. But by 1810, it had landed on an informal economic relationship with the Haitians similar to the British. Despite repeated attempts by the Haitians, nonrecognition by both governments would persist for decades.

These policies of exclusion were the culmination of long-rooted opposition to the overthrow of slavery in the former French colony. From the moment the Revolution began, Great Britain and the United States undertook a series of efforts to shore up the colonial regime on the island and to thwart the formation of a government built by former slaves. President George Washington, for instance, wrote to the French minister as early as September 24,

[58] David Bell, "The Contagious Revolution," *The New York Review of Books*, December 19, 2019, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/12/19/the-contagious-revolution-haiti/. Slaves made up the vast majority of Haiti's population prior to the revolution. In 1789, there were 40,000 whites, 28,000 free blacks and mulattoes, and 452,000 slaves. This meant that slaves outnumbered whites just over 11 to 1. See Donald Hickey, "America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806," *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 2, no. 4 (1982), pg. 362.

[59] Thomson (2000) notes that slavery in the French West Indies was especially oppressive because plantation owners found it cheaper to work slaves to their deaths than to provide care to them as elders. British planters were comparatively less oppressive because they had to pay steep prices for importation of slaves. See Jim Thomson, "The Haitian Revolution and the Forging of America," *The History Teacher*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), pg. 77.

[60] Hickey (1982) estimates that over three hundred thousand people, including civilians, must have died during the course of the Revolution. See Hickey, "America's Response," pg. 364.

[61] Julia Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica in the Remaking of the Early Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2012), pg. 584-585.

1791 to testify to "how well disposed the United States [were] to render every aid in their power... to quell 'the alarming insurrection of the Negroes in Hispaniola."'[62] Over the next year and a half, the United States sent over US $726,000 in aid and loans to the French colonial regime before it collapsed in June 1793.[63] The British government intervened militarily on the island from September 1793 through August 1798 in an attempt to restore slavery there.[64] Moreover, when Napoleon announced his intentions to reassert colonial rule in St. Domingue in 1801, both the United States and Great Britain endorsed the mission. President Thomas Jefferson promised the French minister that the United States would do everything "to reduce Toussaint to starvation," while Prime Minister Henry Addington emphasized to the French that "the interest of the two governments is absolutely the same, namely the destruction of Jacobinism and that of the blacks in particular."[65]

British and U.S. opposition to the Haitian Revolution stemmed, in large part, from

[62]Washington to Ternant, September 24, 1791, Washington Papers, Series 2, Letter Book 23, Image 162, Library of Congress https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw2.023/?sp=162.

[63]The majority of this sum was intended to be an advance on the U.S. revolutionary war debt to France. However, the French Government never authorized the French minister to accept the credits given as a repayment on the war debt, which was known to the Washington administration. Even after the French minister refused to honor notes used by French planters to purchase provisions from American merchants (causing the United States to take responsibility for honoring the notes), the administration continued to provide further credits. See Gordon Brown, *Toussaint's Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005), pg. 56-57; Timothy Matthewson, "George Washington's Policy Toward the Haitian Revolution," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1979), pg. 333.

[64]It is difficult to separate British intervention in Haiti from Great Britain's broader strategy for fighting the French Revolutionary Wars, but there are several features of the intervention that suggest that British opposition to the overthrow of slavery was a primary factor in the decision to intervene militarily. First, the initial troops to arrive in Haiti were sent not by the orders of the British Home Office, but rather by Jamaica's Governor Adam Williamson. In notifying the Home Office that he had sent troops to the island, Williamson indicated that he considered it necessary for Jamaica's defense upon news that French Commissioners had issued a general emancipation to the slaves. See Williamson to Dundas, July 31st, 1793, Colonial Office (CO) 137/91, fos. 51-63, National Archives of the United Kingdom; David Geggus, "Jamaica and the Saint Domingue Slave Revolt, 1791-1793," The Americas, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1981), pg. 219-233. Second, military involvement in the Caribbean made less strategic sense for the defeat of France at the time of intervention, given news of the allied retreat in Flanders and British naval successes off the Southern coast of France. In fact, around this time, King George warned Prime Minister William Pitt about having "too many objects to attend to," and instead suggested that forces designated for St. Domingue would be best diverted allied efforts at Flanders. See David Geggus, "The British Government and the Saint Domingue Slave Revolt, 1791-1793," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 379 (1981), pg. 301. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that British annexation of the French colony was not a forgone conclusion if the British had succeeded in quelling the slave insurrection. In the propositions agreed to by the British government and the French planters that lobbied for British intervention, it was suggested that the colony would be returned to France upon the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne. See "The Propositions of February 25th, 1793," War Office 1/58, fos. 475-538, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[65]For Jefferson quote, see Timothy Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1995), pg. 215. For Addington quote, see Carl Lokke, "Jefferson and the Leclerc Expedition," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1928), pg. 326.

fears that it would spark similar slave uprisings in the British colonies or in the southern United States. As one historian put it, British and U.S. audiences were "quick to see the parallel between their own situation and that of the besieged planters in St. Domingue."[66] An observer in Kingston worried shortly after the uprising began that the slaves were "so different a people from what they were" and was "convinced the ideas of Liberty have sunk so deep in the Minds of all Negroes, that whenever the greatest precautions are not taken they will rise."[67] The British colonies and U.S. South also came alive with rumors of slave plots—some likely hearsay, but others that carried more weight. In Fall 1793, for instance, a white Charlestonian reported that, "[t]wo letters have been intercepted, by which it appears that the negroes and mulattoes intended to serve us as the inhabitants of Cape-Francois were served: they had heard so much from the French negroes about it, and [about] liberty and equality."[68] The letters indicated that blacks in South Carolina had coordinated with others in Virginia and North Carolina and planned to rebel simultaneously.[69]

These fears were compounded when it became clear that a black state might emerge from the uprising. In particular, with Toussaint Louverture's consolidation of power and his victory over the British in 1798, British and U.S. officials began to worry that any regime lead by former slaves would be ideologically revisionist. One U.S. representative argued in a speech before Congress that if Toussaint Louverture declared independence, Haiti's "interest will be wholly black" and that it would "visit the States of South Carolina and Georgia, and spread their views among the negro people there, and excite dangerous insurrections among them."[70] In reality, it seems unlikely that Louverture had much of a desire to export slave revolts beyond Haiti's borders. He did not, for instance, extend emancipation to slaves on the Dominican Republic side of the island when he invaded it in 1801.[71] However, it was not easy to convince British and U.S. officials that he did not hold such revisionist preferences. Even after Louverture betrayed details of a plot to raise slaves in Jamaica to British officials, the Governor of Jamaica and the admiral in charge of the Jamaica Station still insisted he

[66] Alfred Hunt, *Haiti's Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pg. 108.

[67] Anonymous Letter, November 17th, 1791, CO 137/89, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[68] Virginia Chronicle (Norfolk), October 19, 1793. Also quoted in Ashli White, *Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pg. 142.

[69] For more on the Secret Keeper plot, see James Sidbury, "Saint Domingue in Virginia: Ideology, Local Meanings, and Resistance to Slavery, 1790-1800," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (1997), pgs. 531-552.

[70] "Speech of Albert Gallatin," January 21st, 1799, In Thomas Hart Benton, Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (reprint; New York, AMS Press, 1970), Vol. 2, pg. 339.

[71] For more on Toussaint Louverture's apparent conservativism on the issue of slavery, see Philippe Girard, "Black Talleyrand: Toussaint Louverture's Diplomacy, 1798-1802," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 66, No. 1, pg. 91-93; Phillippe Girard and Jean-Louis Donnadieu, "Toussaint before Louverture: New Archival Findings on the Early Life of Toussaint Louverture, *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (2013), pg. 41-78.

harbored designs against them.[72]

To be clear, the threat British and U.S. officials believed Haiti posed to their internal security directly influenced British and U.S. policy during the Revolution. In January 1793, the British Home Secretary wrote to the Jamaican Governor to notify him that the Home Office was considering military intervention in Haiti to protect the British colonies "from the contagion of designs which must lead to their utter subversion."[73] Similarly, the Governor of South Carolina wrote to President Washington to persuade him to provide aid to the French colonists, warning that if the revolution went unchecked, the revolt would become "a flame which will extend to all the neighboring islands and may prove not very pleasing or an agreeable example for the Southern States."[74] In fact, British and U.S. officials often acknowledged that the foreign policies they chose in order to insulate themselves from the Revolution entailed incurring other strategic risks or material costs. A particularly illuminating example is when the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies notified the Jamaican Governor that they had approved Napoleon to send a military expedition to retake control of Haiti, writing that:

> "Whatever may be the consequence of the Reestablishment of the Government of France in the Island of St. Domingo, I think there can be no doubt, that the Eventual Danger from the Continuance of power of Toussaint, or a Black Empire therein any hands, must be the subject of more real and well-founded alarm to Jamaica planters, than any that can be apprehended from its being restored to the Authority of the Mother Country; and therefore, that at all hazards, it is not fit that we should throw any obstacle in the way of the Accomplishment of that Object."[75]

These same ideological considerations underpinned British and U.S. decisions to exclude Haiti from the broader Atlantic community at the time of its independence. In June 1803, Dessalines wrote both to the Governor of Jamaica, George Nugent, and to Thomas Jefferson inviting British and U.S. ships to trade in ports under his control. With victory in his sight, Dessalines hoped to forge relations with other Atlantic powers that could help secure Haiti's

[72] For more on the Sassportas plot, see Zvi Loker, "An Eighteenth-century Plan to Invade Jamaica; Isaac Yeshurun, Sasportas—French Patriot or Jewish Radical Idealist?," *Transactions* & *Miscellanies* (Jewish Historical Society of England, Vol. 28 (1981), pg. 132-144. For the 3rd Earl of Balcarres' and Admiral Hyde Parker's suspicions, see Parker to Balcarres, June 30th, 1800, CO 137/105, National Archives of the United Kingdom; Balcarres to Portland, July 14th, 1799, CO 137/102, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[73] Dundas to Williamson, January 12th, 1793, CO 137/91, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[74] Pinckney to Washington, September 20th, 1791, Record Group 59, Miscellaneous Dispatches, U.S. National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. Text also available in *The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, Vol. 8, 22 March 1791-22 September 1791,* ed. Mark Mastronmarino (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1999, pg. 542-546). For Washington's reply, see Washington to Pinckney, March 15th, 1791, Washington Papers, Series 2, Letter Book 18, Image 113, Library of Congress.

[75] Hobart to Nugent, November 18th, 1801, CO 137/107, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

independence from France. However, little came of these invitations. The British considered entering a trade agreement with the Haitians in exchange for commitments not to export slave rebellion, but negotiations ultimately collapsed. Jefferson never responded.

In response to Dessalines' invitation, Nugent sent two agents to the island and tasked them to "learn of his [Dessalines's] future Intentions with regard to the white inhabitants, as well as his Intercourse with this Island."[76] His main objective was to determine whether Dessalines would consent to an agreement that would create a quarantine around Haiti. In particular, Nugent hoped to replicate an earlier accord made with Toussaint Louverture.[77] The Maitland Conventions, formed after Britain's military defeat in Haiti, opened British trade to ports under Louverture's control in exchange for commitments from Louverture to refrain from promoting slave rebellions abroad.[78] Favoring Louverture, at least temporarily, had been considered expedient as both the French civilian authority in Haiti and Louverture's domestic rival Andre Rigaud had made public their desires to spread slave revolts to the neighboring islands.[79] While British officials repeatedly indicated that they did not trust Louverture's designs, the agreement rendered Louverture's promises credible by restricting his ability to form a navy.[80] By confining the Haitians to their island, British officials

[76]Nugent to Hobart, August 9th, 1803, CO 137/110, Fos. 160, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[77]Gaffield (2012), for instance, writes that Nugent's main objective "was to quarantine the contagion of freedom among slaves and maintain the traditional plantation hierarchy in Jamaica" and other nearby colonies. See Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 590. For similar conclusions, see also H.B.L. Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti, 1801-1805," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1944), pg. 397-408; and Julia Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 93-123.

[78] This agreement, sometimes referred to as the Maitland Convention, was negotiated alongside U.S. officials that offered British and U.S. trade to two ports in Haiti under Louverture's control. Before entering negotiations with Toussaint, Thomas Maitland had traveled to the United States to negotiate the key principles to drive negotiations with Toussaint. Furthermore, the U.S. consul to St. Domingue, Edward Stevens, also joined negotiations with Toussaint on the island. For the principles agreed upon by Great Britain and the United States, see "Heads of Regulations to be Proposed by Brigadier General Maitland to General Toussaint, to be established by the authority of the latter; and to which it is understood that the American Government will assent" and "Points on which there is an understanding between the Government of Great Britain and the United States of America, in Consequence of the forgoing regulations," April 20th, 1799, M-9 Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Cap Haitien, Haiti, 1797-1906," Reel 1 (microfilm), NARA, Atlanta, GA. Text of the "Points of Understanding" can also be found in John Adams, *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a life of the author, notes, and illustrations by his grandson Charles Francis Adams*, Vol. 8, (Boston, MA: Brown, 1850), pg 639 fn. 2.

[79]See Girard, "Black Talleyrand," pg. 101.

[80]Louverture agreed to a long list of clauses that restricted his rights of maritime navigation, including agreeing not to arm any ships or to carry weapons upon them. For full text of the agreement, see "Convention Secrete Arretee entre l'honorable Brigadier General Maitland et le General en Chef de Saint Domingue Toussaint Louverture,' June 13th 1799, Admiralty (ADM) 1/249, National Archives of the United Kingdom. For distrust of Louverture, see Parker to Balcarres, June 30th, 1800, CO 137/105, National Archives of the United Kingdom; Balcarres to Portland, December 7th, 1799, CO 137/103, National Archives of the United Kingdom; Balcarres to Portland, March 23rd, 1800, CO 137/104, National Archives of the United Kingdom. The Governor of Jamaica at the time even suggested that because Louverture could not be trusted, Britain should only favor Louverture as long as Rigaud had the upper

calculated there was much less risk that the ideas of liberty could pollute the minds of their own slaves. Further, without a navy, there was little the Haitians would be able to do to aid the slaves in any revolt that might take place. The British Admiralty ruthlessly enforced the restrictions imposed by the Maitland Convention, capturing Louverture's ships for even the slightest violations of passport and tonnage rules.[81]

British control over Haiti's maritime navigation became the central point of impasse during negotiations.[82] Unlike his predecessor, Dessalines was unwilling to agree to articles limiting Haiti's maritime rights, stating that "the independence of Hayti and the dignity of its Government' was opposed to them.[83] He did seek to reassure the British that Haitians had no intention of serving as "legislators of the Antilles" or "disturbing the tranquility of neighboring islands," but he also reminded them that he – unlike Louverture – was treating with them as the leader of an independent country.[84] He would therefore not allow Haiti to become attached to or dependent upon another government.

Without these articles however, the British felt that Dessalines' promises of restraint were not credible. In correspondence between Nugent, his agent in Haiti, and the British Home office regarding the potential commercial treaty, the necessity of preventing the "Brigands from getting upon the Water" was repeatedly raised.[85] While the Home Office was willing to drop other large demands during negotiations – for instance, demands for British control over military outposts at Mole St. Nicolas and Cape Tiburon—the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies reiterated that Nugent should not "relax in the smallest degree in those articles, which are to watch over and regulate his [Dessalines'] maritime conduct."[86] In

hand in the War of the Knives in order to prolong the conflict. For more, see Girard, "Black Talleyrand," pg. 118.

[81]Hyde Parker, "An Account of armed and merchant vessels captured and destroyed… " June 26th, 1799, CO 137/102, National Archives of the United Kingdom. See also Girard, "Black Talleyrand," pg. 104-109; Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 169-170.

[82] The other major point of contention during negotiations was British demands for control over military outposts at Mole St. Nicolas and Cape Tiburon, but the Home Office ordered Nugent to drop these demands. Smaller points of contention included Dessalines's demands that Great Britain provide Haiti with arms and that he be able to purchase slaves from Britain to repopulate Haiti. In the case of the former, Nugent agreed that British merchants would provide Dessalines with limited arms as Britain deemed necessary for its internal security and defense. In case of the latter, Dessalines' demand was flatly denied. See Corbet to Dessalines, February 10th, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 50N, National Library of Jamaica. For historians' treatment of Nugent's and Dessalines's negotiations, see Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 403-404; and Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 602.

[83]Edward Corbet, "Report No. 1" , January 25th, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 784M, National Library of Jamaica. See also Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 600.

[84]Quotes taken from "Haitian Declaration of Independence," January 1st, 1804, CO 137/111, fos. 113-117, National Archives of the United Kingdom. For Dessalines' comparison to Louverture, see Dessalines to Nugent, May 13th, 1804, MS 7, Box 2, 628N, National Library of Jamaica. Also quoted in Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 604.

[85]Hobart to Nugent, December 6th, 1803. Full text available in Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 401-402.

[86]For dropping the demands for military bases, see Hobart to Nugent, December 6th, 1803, Quoted in Hughes,

March 1804, Nugent notified Dessalines that he would not proceed with negotiations until Dessalines had "a change in sentiments" with regard to the restrictions.[87]

Nugent's decision to suspend negotiations was meant to be a tactic to pressure Dessalines into accepting the articles limiting Haiti's coastal navigation, but it came to mark the end of the negotiations.[88] On February 22nd, 1804, Dessalines ordered his military to undertake a series of massacres against the remaining white French population on the island. These massacres—like the ones the French had undertaken against the black population during Napoleon's attempt to recapture the island—were excessively violent and brutal. First-hand accounts describe the parading of French whites through towns to be drowned, children affixed at the ends of bayonets, and so forth.[89] At the end of April, with virtually all of the white French population dead, Dessalines proclaimed that "The implacable enemies of the rights of man have finally met a punishment worthy of their crimes."[90]

Unsurprisingly, news of these massacres did little to assuage British fears of Dessalines' designs towards their colonies. Nugent reported to the Home Office in June that "The indiscriminate Massacre of the White Inhabitants of St. Domingo will prevent me from maintaining any correspondence with Dessalines."[91] The new Secretary of State for War and the Colonies too indicated that "the Government of that Island is in too unsettled a state to give the expectation of any formal and permanent Arrangement"[92] It is unclear whether Dessalines considered what these massacres would communicate to other slave-holding power in the region, but he did little to conceal them from the view of outsiders. One historian, for instance, notes that he often undertook massacres in plain sight of British and American ships.[93] On August 29th, Nugent penned what would be the final ruling on Haiti's prospects

"British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 401-402. For quotation, see John Jeffreys Pratt (Lord Camden), "Thoughts on a Treaty with Dessalines," n.d., CO 137/111, fos. 170, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[87]Nugent to Dessalines, March 8th, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 315N, National Library of Jamaica.

[88]Nugent wrote to the Home Office on March 19th, 1804, to notify them that he had suspended trade in hopes that Dessalines would come around to his proposals. See Nugent to Hobart, March 19th, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 616N, National Library of Jamaica.

[89]For explanations of Dessalines' decision to order the massacres, see Philippe Girard, "Caribbean Genocide: Racial War in Haiti, 1802-1804," *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (2005), pg. 138-161.

[90]Quoted in Girard, "Caribbean Genocide," pg. 141.

[91]Nugent to Hobart, June 10th, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 613N, National Library of Jamaica. Full text also available in Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 405.

[92]Unlike Nugent, John Jeffreys Pratt (Lord Camden) still believed entering an agreement with Dessalines could be viable and advantageous provided that all of Haitian intercourse with the neighboring colonies were prohibited and Dessalines agreed to British control over its coastal navigation. However, the 1804 Massacres did notably shift the type of agreement Pratt was willing to make. In particular, he no longer believed it wise "to conclude a Treaty in that of his Majesty," instead requesting that the agreement be entered into in Nugent's name as had been previously done between Maitland and Louverture. See Camden to Nugent, August 31st, 1804, MS 72, Box 3, 468N, National Library of Jamaica. Full text also available in Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 406.

[93]Girard, "Caribbean Genocide," pg. 141.

for a formal relationship with the British empire for more than three decades: "[U]ntil a Change takes place in the Government of St. Domingo no agreement can be entered into, in the smallest Degree advantageous to the British Interests, nor that it will be found political to renew the former Treaty at a future Period, under the horrid Circumstances of the last Revolution."[94]

Nugent's successor also chose not to attempt any negotiations with Haitian leaders and the British empire. In 1806, the King issued Orders in Council that allowed merchants to obtain special licenses from the Privy Council to trade in Haitian ports, but there was no formal agreement with Haitian leaders to govern these interactions.[95] Individual merchants often had to negotiate tariff rates on a case-by-case basis; they complained of the caprice Haitian officials held with regard to these rates.[96] Moreover, several steps were taken to minimize the threat Haiti posed to the internal security of Britain's possessions in the Caribbean. Legislation was passed to outlaw travel or commerce between Haitian and the British colonies.[97] The British admiralty also unilaterally enforced the restrictions on Haiti's maritime navigation that Dessalines had rejected. British cruisers ruthlessly policed Haitian territorial waters, capturing any armed vessels in the area.[98] As one historian writes, the British "tried to physically contain Haitians within their borders in order to prevent contact with the enslaved populations of the British Caribbean."[99]

Although the United States initially went further to restrict trade with the island, it nevertheless landed on policies similar to the British by 1810. The heightened hostility from the United States can partly be explained by the fact that Jefferson was particularly sensitive to the possible contagion of the Haitian Revolution. Since the 1780s, he had written extensively that—without the mass deportation of blacks from the country—slavery in the United States would inevitably lead to a race war, "which will probably never end but in the extermination of one or the other race."[100] The Haitian Revolution and the subsequent atrocities that took place, then, were his worst fears realized. During his time in government, he would take many actions to prevent the success of the Haitian Revolution. As Secretary of State under Washington, he made open-ended commitments to provide the French white

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[94] Nugent to Camden, August 29th, 1804. Full text also available in Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti," pg. 407.

[95] In 1808, the King issued a follow-up Order in Council that removed the need to obtain the licenses to engage in the trade. For more on the 1806 and 1808 Orders in Council, see Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pgs. 93-123.

[96] For more on the informal interactions between British merchants and Haitian leaders, see Nathalie Pierre, "Liberal Trade in the Postcolonial Americas: Haitian Leaders and British Agents, 1806-1813," *Journal of Haitian Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pg. 68-99.

[97] This legislation is referenced in Canning to MacKenzie, January 16th, 1826, Foreign Office (FO) 35/2, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[98] Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 188; Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 186-187.

[99] Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 188.

[100] Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIV, (1781) pg. 229. Text available at https://www.pbs.org/jefferson/archives/documents/frame_ih199641.htm.

planters aid in suppressing the slave insurrection.[101] As Vice President under Adams, he warned of the dangers of engaging in trade with the Haitians. "We may expect therefore black crews, & supercargoes & missionaries thence into the southern states," he wrote to James Madison, ". . . If this combustion can be introduced among us under any veil whatsoever, we have to fear it."[102]

Recent slave plots in the U.S. south intensified Jefferson's personal fears. The most serious of which was Gabriel's Conspiracy that was planned to take place in his own home state of Virginia. On the night of August 30th, 1800, several hundred slaves under the leadership of Gabriel Prosser were to initiate an attack on Richmond.[103] Similar to the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution, the conspirators intended to set the area on fire, and they planned to capture Virginia Governor James Monroe. The rebellion was narrowly avoided because two slaves betrayed details of the plot to their owner only hours before participants were supposed to gather.[104] Had torrential rains not delayed their assembly, the Virginia government would not have had time to organize against the rebellion. Moreover, while there were no evident links between this plot and the Haitian revolutionaries, U.S. audiences were quick to make an association between the two.[105] Following news of another slave plot in Virginia, Jefferson commented that the "course of things in the neighboring islands of the West Indies appears to have given considerable impulse to the minds of slaves" and that a "great disposition to insurgency has manifested itself among them."[106]

Although Jefferson in principle was opposed to sweeping government regulations, news of the 1804 massacres changed his attitudes towards policing the unregulated trade with Haiti. U.S. merchants – particularly from the North – conducted a significant amount of business in Haitian ports at the time, even though there was no formal agreement to govern these interactions. For years, French officials had lodged complaints about American merchant behavior and their willingness to supply the black population.[107] But the Jefferson administration had been willing to rebuff French complaints, noting that even though the

[101] Jefferson to Short, November 24th, 1791, Jefferson Papers, Series 1: General Correspondence, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib005687/.

[102] Jefferson to Madison, February 5th, 1799, Madison Papers, Series 1: General Correspondence, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.06_0646_0648/?st=gallery.

[103] William Mosby to Governor James Monroe, September 1800, Governor's Office, Letters Received, James Monroe, Record Group 3, Library of Virginia.

[104] Mosby Sheppard to Governor James Monroe, August 30 1800, Governor's Office, Letters Received, James Monroe, Record Group 3, Library of Virginia.

[105] Hunt, *Haiti's Influence*, pg. 118-120; Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 182; Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti," pg.217-218.

[106] Jefferson to King, July 13th, 1802, Jefferson Papers, Series 1: General Correspondence, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mtj1.026_0770_0774/?st=list.

[107] See, for example Leclerc to Minister of Marine, Feb. 9, 1802, Henry Adams Transcripts, Library of Congress. French Ambassador Louis Pichon also repeatedly indicated in his reports to Charles Talleyrand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Napoleon, that he raised complaints to the Jefferson administration to little satisfaction. For a discussion of Pichon's complaints, see Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti," pg. 227-228.

U.S. government did not approve of this behavior, it was up to France to enforce any trade bans they wished to place on the island.[108] This line changed shortly after the massacres, with Jefferson inquiring to the judiciary whether it was within executive authority to take measures against trade – especially in articles of contraband – with Haiti.[109] A few months later, John Quincy Adams noted after discussing the administration's policy towards Haiti with Jefferson that "This [trade] he appears determined to suppress and I presume a law will pass for the purpose at the approaching session [of Congress]."[110] Jefferson's Secretary of Treasury would later recount that "One of the principle motives" for Jefferson's change in attitude ". . . was the apprehension of the danger which at the time (immediately after the last massacre of the whites there) might account on our numerous slaves, arise from the unrestricted intercourse with the black population of that island."[111]

The push to restrict trade with Haiti unfolded in two acts. The first began with Jefferson's opening address to Congress in November 1804, in which he asked Congress to pass legislation to halt trade – especially in contraband – with Haiti.[112] Shortly afterwards, Democratic Republicans introduced a bill to prohibit armed trade to the Caribbean.[113] Because ships traveling to Haiti faced a high risk of seizure by French and Spanish privateers, the act was designed to deter commerce to the new state with minimal government interference.[114] The bill was significantly weakened, however, by the time it passed through the House and the Senate. Instead of prohibiting the armed trade, it merely prevented ships from selling their weapons or using them for non-defensive purposes.[115] Next, after a series of high profile gun-running incidents proved how ineffective the first bill had been, Democratic Republicans introduced a full embargo of trade Haiti in December 1805.[116] The bill passed in the House 93-26 and in the Senate 21-8.[117] The embargo went into effect in February 1806 and would

[108] Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 214-215.

[109] Hickey, "America's Response," pg. 371.

[110] John Quincy Adams, "Entry of October 31st, 1804," in *Memories of John Quincy Adams: Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848*, Ed. C.F. Adams (Philadelphia, PA: JB Lippincott & Co, 1878-1877), Vol. 1, pg. 314. See also Hickey, "America's Response," pg. 371; Timothy Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 140, No. 1 (1996), pg. 29.

[111] As quoted in Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition," pg. 34

[112] Jefferson to Congress, November 8th, 1804, *Annals of Congress*, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, pg. 11.

[113] William Eustis first introduced a bill to regulate the clearance of armed ships, but John Eppes moved to prohibit the armed trade to the Caribbean in total.

[114] There was much intra-party disagreement over this bill. Many Democratic Republicans, including William Eustis who had introduced the bill but with more limited measures, complained about the effects prohibiting any merchant vessels from arming would have on trade to other states in the Caribbean. See *The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States*, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, pg. 814.

[115] Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 245-263.

[116] The most famous of which involved Rufus King, who publicly celebrated a gun-running expedition to St. Domingo shortly after the first clearance bill was passed. See Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti," pg. 31.

[117] Hickey, "America's Response," pg. 376.

last through 1810.[118]

Domestic discourse over both bills, again, reveals the centrality of fears about the threat Haiti posed to U.S. domestic stability in the decision to isolate the island. One newspaper, for instance, argued that it was best to avoid "commerce with a horde of uncivilized and bloodthirsty revolters who, if encouraged, would devastate the West Indies and even threaten us with domestic danger."[119] In Congress, John Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, suggested that trade with Haiti would result in the "immediate and horrible destruction on the fairest portion of America."[120] Senator James Jackson from Georgia warned that "one of those brigands [Haitians] introduced into the Southern States was worse than a hundred importations from Africa, and more dangerous to the United States." Importantly, such assessments were not only shared among those from the South, whose lives and property would be most at risk if a slave rebellion did occur. Both the 1805 Clearance Act and 1806 trade embargo were introduced by Northern Democratic Republicans. In introducing the Clearance Act, Senator William Eustis from Massachusetts argued that the United States should not be engaging in armed trade with "a class of people it is the interest of the United States to depress and keep down."[121] Senator George Logan from Pennsylvania echoed these remarks when introducing the full trade embargo, asking if it was "sound policy to cherish the black population to cherish the black population of St. Domingo whilst we have a similar population in our Southern States."[122]

Even opponents of the trade embargo recognized the threat Haiti posed to the domestic stability of the South. However, they challenged whether restricting trade with the Haitians would reduce this threat. Representative Joseph Clay, for instance, noted that "Were America to suspend her intercourse with St. Domingo, the evil of having the present inhabitants would not be lessened."[123] Others feared that restricting trade with Haiti could backfire by provoking the Haitians to export their revolution. The trade embargo, Federalist Samuel White from Delaware argued, "aimed a blow at their very vitals" and that Haitian leaders would consider the United States as "sided with their enemies."[124] Of course, these were not the only objections that opponents of the embargo raised. Aside from wanting to preserve a lucrative trade with Haiti, opponents also complained that the embargo would give the appearance of the United States caving to French complaints.[125]

When the trade embargo ended in 1810, U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti looked very similar to that of Great Britain. Both states engaged in only informal economic exchange with the Caribbean nation—most of which confined directly to Haitian ports—and more

[118]Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 147-152.
[119]As quoted in White, *Encountering Revolution*, pg. 164.
[120]Speech of John Eppes, February 25th, 1806, *Annals of Congress*, 9th Congress, 1st Session, pg. 515
[121]Speech of William Eustis, December 13th, 1804, *Annals of Congress*, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, pg. 813.
[122]Speech of George Logan, December 20th, 1805, *Annals of Congress*, 9th Congress., 1st Session., pg. 26-29
[123]Speech of Joseph Clay, December 13th, 1804, *Annals of Congress*, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, pg. 815.
[124]As quoted in Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 145.
[125]Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition," pg. 30.

importantly, both governments refused to recognized Haiti's independence from France.[126] While nonrecognition did not amount to an open act of hostility like those Great Britain and the United States had undertaken during the revolution, it nonetheless indicated a serious regime dispute with the Haitian government. In particular, nonrecognition marked the approbation of the British and U.S. governments for France to recapture the Haiti and restore colonial rule there. The British would make this mandate explicit in a secret agreement with France during the Congress of Vienna, where they both recognized Haiti as the property of France and agreed not to obstruct any efforts by France to attack the country.[127] Likewise, the United States chose specifically to exclude Haiti from the protection that the Monroe Doctrine offered to other newly independent states in Latin and Central America.[128] In particular, the United States would only react negatively towards European hostility towards Latin American governments "who have declared their independence and maintained it, *and whose independence [the United States] have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged*."[129] In fact, on the part of the Haitians, "diplomatic recognition was the only safeguard against French attack."[130]

In the decades following Haitian independence, Haitian leaders would make several attempts to secure recognition from Great Britain and from the United States. After the collapse of negotiations with the British in 1804, Dessalines and subsequent Haitian leaders attempted to use British merchants as envoys to the Home Office, offering discounts on exports in exchange for lobbying by merchants for diplomatic recognition in London. Merchants with even the most dubious connections to officials in the Home Office were able to exploit Haitian insecurity for large profits.[131] Government officials also made overtures to prominent abolitionists who they thought might be able to help them obtain recognition.[132] In 1819, one Haitian minister complained to Thomas Clarkson about Great Britain's contin-

[126]Like their British counterparts, U.S. merchants frequently complained that the lack of official communication from their government disadvantaged them in the business on the island. For example, Jacob Lewis wrote to Madison (during his capacity as Secretary of State) that "I cannot help thinking that if . . . the policy of our Government is to Encourage the Trade to this Island, it would be well to Communicate with the Emperor, if not directly, let him have assurances of our Friendship and our determination to Support our Commerce with them while the property and Citizens of the U.S. are respected. . . " See Lewis to Madison, October 1st, 1804, State Department Consular Despatches, Cape Haitian Series, Vol. 4, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). See also Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 124.

[127]Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2012), pg. 76.

[128]Rayford Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), pg. 207-209.

[129]Emphasis added.

[130]Brenda Plummer, *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992), pg. 33.

[131]Pierre, "Liberal Trade," pg. 68-71.

[132]David Geggus, "British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791-1805," In *Slavery and British Society 1776-1846* (London, UK: Palgrave Press), pg. 123-149.

ued policy of non-recognition even though they allowed their merchants in Haitian ports.[133] Throughout the 1820s and into the 1830s, Haitian leaders again and again expressed their "anxious wish" to enter talks with Britain about formal recognition.[134] Best put by Haitian Secretary General Balthazar Inginac in 1837, Haitian leaders felt that British recognition was "a measure that would give a permanent security to their independence."[135]

The United States also continued to reject Haitian appeals for formal recognition. In a bid for recognition in 1815, President Alexander Petion sought to assure the United States that Haiti's only enemies were "those of humanity and reason," but his overtures were met with silence.[136] Similarly, Secretary General Inginac wrote to U.S. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in 1823 pleading for "an act of the legislature ... [to] recognize her independence which already counts its nineteenth year."[137] President James Monroe directed both the Secretary-General's letter and a follow up letter from the U.S. merchant who had delivered the correspondence "not to be answered."[138] A few months later, President Monroe reiterated the U.S. stance on Haiti in a special message to Congress, clarifying that while Haiti may have maintained de facto independence from France, it was his duty to take "suitable precautions" to guard against "every circumstance which may by any possibility affect the tranquility of any part [of the Union]."[139] In other words, U.S. recognition would not be forthcoming. Ultimately, British and U.S. policies would force the Haitians to purchase recognition from France in 1825 at a hefty price: granting the French Most Favored Nation status with a 50% tariff reduction and the payment of the modern equivalent of US$ 21 billion that would take until 1947 to be paid off.[140]

So far, I have shown that in the decades following Haitian independence, Great Britain and the United States pursued largely similar policies of economic and diplomatic exclusion towards the new Caribbean nation. While the United States originally went further to restrict trade with Haiti, both states followed "parallel paths" by 1810 when the U.S. embargo ended. Both Great Britain and the United States maintained only informal economic ties to Haiti, and more importantly, neither was willing to bestow formal diplomatic recognition. I have

[133]See Prevost to Clarkson, November 20th 1819. Full text available in Earl Griggs and Clifford Prator, *Henry Christophe, Thomas Clarkson: A Correspondence* (University of California Press, 1952), pg. 173.

[134] Erin Zavitz, "From Amity and Commerce to Slave Trade Suppression: British Conventions and Haitian Recognition, 1825-1840," Presented at the Haitian Studies Association's Annual Conference, November 2010, Brown University.

[135]Ussher to Palmerston, October 28th, 1837, Foreign Office (FO) 35/19, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[136]Quoted in Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 193.

[137]Quoted in Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations*, pg. 198

[138]Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations*, pg. 198.

[139]Quoted in Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations*, pg. 205.

[140]Originally, Haitian President Jean Boyer agreed to pay 150 million Francs in exchange for French recognition, but this sum was reduced to 90 million francs in 1838. See Jeffrey Sommers, *Reality, and Realpolitik: U.S.-Haiti Relations in the Lead Up to the 1915 Occupation* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2015), pg. 124.

also provided evidence of the mechanisms that link British and U.S. ideological incongruity with the Haitian government to their preference to seeing it overthrown. From nearly the moment the Haitian Revolution began, British and U.S. officials feared its implications for the domestic stability of its colonies and its Southern States. These same fears – namely, that the existence of a black government free from slavery would inspire slave rebellions within their own borders or worse, act to incite them – underpinned decisions to exclude Haiti from the broader Atlantic community at the time of independence. They did this at the expense of benefits from trade, and at times, at the expense of security against threats from France. In the next section, I discuss the ideological shift caused by British emancipation and assess its impact on British foreign policy. If ideological incompatibility is a major source of regime disputes, then we should observe a divergence of British and U.S. foreign policy after emancipation.

5 British Emancipation and the Divergence of British and U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Haiti

Haitian acceptance into the larger Atlantic community was slow to come. In 1824, two decades after declaring its own independence, no government had yet bestowed diplomatic recognition on the Caribbean nation.[141] This would change the following year, when Charles X of France formally recognized Haitian independence in exchange for a crippling indemnity and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status.[142] But despite recognition from the former imperial metropole, Britain and the United States continued to deny Haitian sovereignty and maintain only informal economic links to the country. In this section, I show that these policies of exclusion would change only after these states' ideological incompatibility with the Haitian government came to an end. For Britain, this incompatibility ceased in 1838 following emancipation in its colonies and the subsequent transition period of "apprenticeship." While Britain and the United States followed largely "parallel paths" of exclusion after the end of the Haitian Revolution, Great Britain quickly diverged from the United States, extending diplomatic recognition just a little over a year later. Haiti would have to wait another 23

[141] The question of recognizing Haiti was the most relevant to states that had meaningful contact with the Caribbean. Beyond Great Britain, France, and the United States, this list would mostly include Spain and newly independent countries in Central and South America. Slavery continued in Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico until well after the American Civil War, which may help explain why Spain had not also extended recognition at this time. While slavery had been abolished in most newly independent states in the region, the United States put significant pressure on these governments not to recognize Haiti. See Charles Wesley, "The Struggle for the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1917), pgs. 369-383.

[142] France had not yet re-abolished slavery at the time of recognition. However, it is also worth noting that with the loss of Haiti, France's colonial possessions in the Caribbean were limited only to Guadeloupe and Martinique – two very small islands that even today have a smaller population than the number of slaves on St. Domingue in 1791.

years before receiving recognition from the United States in 1862—after southern states had seceded from the Union and just a few months prior to Lincoln's emancipation proclamation.

This section proceeds as follows. I first describe British emancipation, including the forced-labor system of apprenticeship that was put in place from 1834 to 1838 in order to transition the colonies away from slavery. I then document the divergence of British and U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti. While Great Britain quickly recognized Haiti, deepened its economic links with the country, and even began cooperating with Haitian leaders to police the Atlantic slave trade, the United States continued to withhold diplomatic recognition and avoid developing strong ties to the government. I also provide evidence that the U.S. decision to withhold recognition was still linked to fears of Haiti's influence on its own domestic stability.

The campaign for the full emancipation of slavery began in Great Britain in 1823, with the foundation of the Society for the Mitigation and Gradual Abolition of Slavery. Like the earlier push for the abolition of the slave trade, the movement followed a similar pattern of grassroots mobilization and petition campaigns before the introduction of abolitionist motions in Parliament.[143] The movement gained steam between 1828 and 1833, with Parliament receiving over 5,000 petitions containing almost 1.5 million signatures demanding immediate action to end slavery in its colonies. One petition received by Parliament was over a half a mile long, having been sewn together by women abolitionists and contained over 350,000 signatures.[144]

In May 1833, Lord Stanley introduced the Slavery Abolition Act in Parliament, and it passed into law on August 29th that year. The abolitionist cause had been aided by the Great Reform Acts of 1832, which expanded the franchise, abolished a number of small "pocket boroughs" that were beholden to the West India interest, and granted MPs to cities (which were often the locus of abolitionist activity).[145] However, it would be incorrect to portray the parliamentary politics of abolishing slavery as a simple victory of an abolitionist political party over a party that staunchly defended slavery resulting from the 1832 elections. While abolitionists tended to align more closely with the Whigs and allies of slaveowners with the Tories by the 1830s, MPs both for and against emancipation could be found across party lines.[146] Furthermore, the primary cleavages in opinion about emancipation among MPs was not disagreement over the "moral correctness" of slavery. It was instead over whether Parliament should intervene in the internal affairs of the colonies.[147] For this reason, excepting the most radical of the abolitionists, most MPs prioritized getting "buy in" from

[143] Seymour Drescher, *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pg. 248.

[144] David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pg. 238.

[145] Kaufman and Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action," pg. 654-656.

[146] Michael Taylor, "The British West India Interest and Its Allies, 1823-1833," *The English Historical Review* Vol. 133, No. 565 (2018), pg. 1478-1511.

[147] Higman, "The West India 'Interest'," pg. 1-19.

the planters.[148] To secure the support of the planters and their allies in parliament, the Slavery Abolition Act included a payout of £20 million to compensate plantation owners for their "property loss."[149]

Importantly, the Slavery Abolition Act did not immediately end slavery in the British colonies. While all slaves were legally declared free when the bill went into force in August 1834, it also created a forced "apprenticeship" system to transition to full freedom. Under this system, all slaves over the age of six were required to continue to work unpaid for their former masters for another four to six years.[150] Metropolitan abolitionists then launched a final popular campaign to end the apprenticeship system. By August 1st, 1838, the British government had successfully pressured colonial legislatures into enacting legislation that terminated the apprenticeship system, marking the official end of slavery—both in name and practice—in the British colonies.

If ideological dissimilarity is a source of regime disputes between states, then the emancipation of slavery in British colonies should correspond with improvement in British-Haitian relations. This is, in fact, what we see. In December 1838—only four months after slavery had officially ended in the colonies—the British government granted Captain George Courtenay the authority to negotiate a treaty to recognize Haiti's independence.[151]

Over the next year, Captain Courtenay attempted to negotiate two treaties with Haitian leaders: the first, a commercial treaty, and the second, a joint treaty to police the Atlantic slave trade. By this time, commercial treaties had become the preferred means of the British government to bestow diplomatic recognition on newly independent states in Central and Latin America, having been used to recognize states like Brazil and Mexico in the 1820s.[152] However, British demands in trade negotiations ran up against agreements Haitian leaders had already made with France. In particular, Britain wanted to obtain MFN status with Haiti, but President Boyer had committed to giving France lower duties than any other foreign government in the 1825 deal for recognition.[153]

Instead of abandoning the project of Haitian recognition however, Courtenay proceeded with negotiations for Haiti to help suppress the slave trade. Article IV of the Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade explicitly acknowledged "the Republick of Hayti: as a sovereign and independent state possesses the exclusive right to police its waters."[154] Recognizing Haiti—as well as its rights to maritime navigation—represented a significant

[148] Izhak Gross, "The Abolition of Negro Slavery and British Parliamentary Politics, 1832-1833," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1980), pg. 63-85.

[149] This amounted to 40% of the Treasury's income in 1833 or approximately 5% of British annual GDP.

[150] House slaves were required to continue their work for 4 years, while field slaves were required to work for 6 years.

[151] Foreign Office to Courtenay, 15 December 1838, FO 35/20, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[152] Zavitz, "From Amity and Commerce."

[153] Ibid.

[154] "Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade," December 23, 1839, FO 84/330, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

change in policy for Great Britain, given that warships from the Jamaica Station had still policing Haitian territorial waters. The treaty, in other words, removed the authority of British admiralty to capture Haitian armed ships.[155]

The commercial treaty Great Britain and Haiti finally concluded in 1844 went further to remove the barriers that prevented Haitian integration into the larger Atlantic community. This treaty, entitled the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Hayti," opened up British ports to Haitian ships. Article I clearly states: "That there shall be reciprocal freedom of commerce between the United Kingdom and Great Britain and Ireland and the Republic of Haiti. The subjects of the two countries respectively shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports, and rivers in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Haiti, to which other foreigners are or may be permitted to come, and to enter into the same, to remain, and reside in any port of the said territories respectively."[156]

It is difficult to process trace the absence of fears relating to Haiti's potential impact on the stability of British colonies at the time of recognition. But we can nonetheless see the continued influence of these fears before British emancipation by examining the only other time Britain entertained the possibility of recognizing Haiti before 1838. Following French recognition, Great Britain sent a consul to the island on an information gathering mission in 1826.[157] The British Foreign Secretary instructed Consul Charles Mackenzie to "record information on the internal state of Haiti, it's relations with France, and the status of agricultural production" —the latter of which would be useful for drafting a commercial treaty with the Caribbean nation.[158] While in Haiti, Mackenzie opened discussions with the leadership about a potential commercial treaty, but ultimately decided to cut off negotiations. The main economic points of impasse were the same as those in the 1838 negotiations: namely, Haitian leadership would not offer Britain MFN status because they had already granted it to the French the previous year. Notably, when the trade negotiations failed, Secretary General Inginac proposed a counter-project for Haitian recognition, expressing a desire to help police the Atlantic slave trade.[159] But British officials ignored the prospects for such a treaty.

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[155] Gaffield, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 191-192.

[156] "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between her Britannic Majesty and the Republic of Hayti," FO 35/28, National Archives of the United Kingdom. Also quoted in Gaffied, *Haitian Connections*, pg. 191-192.

[157] Note that neither the British nor the Haitians believed that the presence of a consul constituted diplomatic recognition or an otherwise significant change in the status of their current relations. In late 1831, for instance, one British consul asked whether the government had "an intention of entering into more defined and permanent Relations with the Republick." Poussett to Palmerston, May 5th, 1831, FO 35/13, National Archives of the United Kingdom. Similarly, Inginac remarked in 1837 that the Haitians still desired British recognition as "a measure that would give a permanent security to their independence." Ussher to Palmerston, October 28, 1837, FO 35/19, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[158] Zavitz, "From Amity and Commerce."

[159] Mackenzie to Canning, December 30th, 1826, FO 35/4, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

There are two features of the proposed trade agreement and the decision to cut off negotiations that indicate Haiti's potential influence on the British colonies weighed heavily in the decision to continue withholding diplomatic recognition. First, while the proposed commercial treaty would open ports in Great Britain to Haitian ships, the Foreign Secretary insisted that the Haitians agree to articles prohibiting their travel to the British colonies.[160] These prohibitions were especially important because the British West Indies had become engulfed with acts of slave resistance. In 1823, for instance, there was the Argyle War in the Hanover Parish of Jamaica involving thousands of slaves, and an even larger revolt in Demerara that same year.[161] While these rebellions were largely non-violent, government officials were sensitive to the possibility of foreign intrigue. This brings us to the second feature of Mackenzie's dealings with the Haitian government: namely, he suspected President Boyer planned to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among the slaves of the British colonies.[162] There is no evidence that Boyer had any such designs, but Mackenize nevertheless recommended that Jamaican warships be placed on heightened alert before leaving the island in 1827.[163]

There is also substantial evidence that the United States' continued refusal to recognize Haitian independence related to its fears that Haiti would inspire or otherwise act to incite slave uprisings. Shortly after France bestowed diplomatic recognition on Haiti in 1825, a senator from Missouri expressed these fears explicitly in a speech to Congress. "We buy coffee from her, and pay for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers. We receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors," Thomas Benton explained, "And why? Because the peace of eleven states in this Union will not permit the fruits of a successful Negro insurrection be exhibited among them."[164] Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina echoed this sentiment, remarking that "We never can acknowledge her [Haiti's] independence... the peace and safety of a large portion of our Union forbids us to even discuss [it]."[165]

These comments came on the heels of Denmark Vesey's planned rebellion in Charleston in 1822, which clearly drew inspiration from the Haitian example. Vesey had spent much time in the West Indies as a slave for a slave trader during his youth, but he bought his freedom

[160] Canning to Mackenzie, January 16th, 1826, FO 35/2, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[161] Michael Craton, *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), pg. 335-339. .

[162] Robert Lacerte, "Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843," *The America's*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1981), pg. 504. See also Canning to Mackenzie, January 18th, 1826, FO 35/2, National Archives of the United Kingdom; "Memorandum," FO 35/18, National Archives of the United Kingdom; and Mackenzie to Aberdeen, July 18th, 1826, FO 35/8, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[163] Zavitz, "From Amity and Commerce"; Mackenzie to Canning, November 8th, 1826, FO 35/4, National Archives of the United Kingdom; Mackenzie to Canning, November 25th, 1826, FO 35/4, National Archives of the United Kingdom; and Mackenzie to Canning, December 18th, 1826, FO 35/4, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[164] Quoted in Wesley, "The Struggle for the Recognition," pg. 373.

[165] Quoted in Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1914-1934* (Camden, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), pg. 28.

and began preaching in Charleston by 1818. In this capacity, Vesey developed extensive plans for an attack on the city. But like Gabriel's Conspiracy in 1800, the details of the plot were betrayed before the uprising could take place. During the subsequent investigation and trial, one of Vesey's conspirators testified that Vesey had written to Boyer seeking his aid in the rebellion. There again was no evidence that Boyer had responded to Vesey's letter, but another participant testified that Vesey had instructed his followers "not to spare one white skin alive, for this was the play they pursue in St. Domingo."[166]

Comments like Senator Benton's and Senator Hayne's would be made again and again whenever the topic of Haitian recognition was broached in Congress. After receiving an anonymous petition that called for establishing diplomatic relations with the Caribbean nation in 1838, Representative Hugh Legare suggested that "if this course is permitted to go on, the sun of this Union will go down—it will go down in blood and go down to rise no more" and equated such petitions to treason.[167] In 1839 the Committee on Foreign Affairs asked that petitions demanding the opening of relations with Haiti to no longer be considered.[168] While the petitions continued, there was no movement in Congress on the issue.

It was not until the southern states seceded in in 1861 that any progress on recognizing Haiti was made. In his opening speech to Congress, President Abraham Lincoln called for establishing formal relations with the country, noting that he was "unable to discern" "any good reason… why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition."[169] Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner formally introduced a bill to recognize Haiti the following February. While senators from two of the four remaining slaves states in Congress opposed the bill, it passed easily.[170] Two years later, the United States and Haiti signed a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Marking a dramatic turn in U.S. policy and formally ending its regime dispute with Haiti, Article XIV committed the United States to "lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."[171]

Taken together, the evidence suggests that ideological cleavages increase the risk of regime disputes. Before slavery was outlawed in the British colonies, both Great Britain and the United States pursued largely parallel foreign policies of isolating Haiti. However, after slavery ended in the colonies in 1838, Great Britain formally extended diplomatic recognition to Haiti, notably in a joint treaty to police the Atlantic slave trade. The United States, however, continued to isolate Haiti until 1862, shortly after Southern states seceded from

[166] Quoted in Hunt, *Haiti's Influence*, pg. 119.

[167] Quoted in Wesley, "The Struggle for Recognition," pg. 374-375.

[168] Ibid, pg. 375.

[169] Leslie Alexander, "'The Black Republic': The Influence of the Haitian revolution on Northern Black Political Consciousness, 1816-1862," In Alysaa Goldstein Sepinwall (ed), *Haitian History: New Perspectives* (Routledge Press, 2012), pg. 211.

[170] Wesley, "The Struggle for Recognition," pg. 380.

[171] https://www.haiti-now.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Treaties-and-Other-International-Agreements-of-the-United-States-of-America-1776-1949.pdf FIGURE OUT HOW TO CITE.

the Union. Moreover, the evidence suggests that British and U.S. opposition to Haiti before emancipation was caused largely by fears that Haitian leaders had regime-revisionist preferences and by fears of political contagion.

6 Addressing Alternative Explanations and Other Threats to Inference

To increase our confidence that ideological threats increase the risk of regime disputes, there are a number of threats to inference that need to be addressed. In this section, I discuss these possibilities, as well as alternative mechanisms that could link ideological dissimilarity to an increased risk of regime hostility.

6.1 Threats Relating to Assignment to Treatment

There are two types of inferential threats relating to assignment to treatment that must be addressed. First, we need to rule out that British emancipation was caused by Britain having better relations with Haiti than the United States. If it were, then it would be inappropriate to conclude that the Britain's ideological shift regarding slavery diminished their regime hostilities with Haiti, as opposed to the other way around. Second, we also need to show that the factors that contributed to British emancipation did not also independently cause its recognition of Haiti. I address each of these concerns in turn.

In favor of the first charge, there is some evidence that Great Britain was less hostile to Haiti on average than the United States was. For instance, in 1804 and again in 1826, Great Britain expressed openness to recognizing Haitian independence, whereas the United States was unwilling to entertain the possibility. Moreover, while not direct evidence of the level of regime-related hostilities, Haiti did charge lower duties on British goods than on U.S. ones—leading to frequent complaints by U.S. merchants about the apparent favoritism.[172]

However, even if there was some degree of favoritism towards the British, there is no evidence that the quality of Britain's relations with Haiti motivated its decision to abolish slavery. While the subject of Haiti was sometimes raised in abolitionist campaigns, it was used to demonstrate the danger slave resistance posed and to draw inferences about the likely economic consequences of abolishing slavery. The former argument featured more heavily in the push to abolish the slave trade in 1807. Given the horrid scenes that had transpired during the Haitian Revolution and again in the 1804 massacres, abolitionists argued on practical grounds that it was hardly the time to be increasing the imbalance between whites and blacks in the colonies through the importation of slaves.[173] But notice that this argument is neither based on quality of relations with Haiti nor is it Britain-specific in a way that we

[172] Matthewson, "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti," pg. 35.
[173] Geggus, "British Opinion," pg. 123-149.

would expect it to only cause emancipation in Great Britain and not in the United States. In fact, the dangers of importing slaves – particularly of those that had been exposed to the Revolution – lead to some of the first steps towards abolishing the slave trade taken in the United States. South Carolina banned the importation of French slaves in 1792, and Georgia and Virginia followed suit the following year, banning any slaves that had traveled to the French West Indies.[174]

Abolitionists' use of Haiti to assess the economic consequences of abolishing slavery also did not appeal to the quality of British-Haitian relations. Rather than appeal to Haitian's treatment of British merchants, abolitionists sought to use statistics about Haitian productivity to determine whether the British colonies could sustain high levels of output without slavery. However, since Haitian emancipation had been the product of a violent revolution, many considered the Haitian example not to be useful for drawing conclusions about what would happen in the British case. In introducing the motion to end slavery in 1833, Edward Stanley told his fellow MPs that the Haitian experiment was "both irrelevant and inconclusive."[175] So, while there is modest evidence to suggest that Great Britain was less hostile towards Haiti than the United States was, there is not evidence that Britain's somewhat more favorable disposition towards Haiti influenced its decision to outlaw slavery.

As for the second inferential threat, historians generally agree that explaining emancipation requires understanding the factors that facilitated the mass mobilization of public opinion against slavery.[176] After all, despite the deep religious and class divides in British society, the ratio of signatures calling for emancipation in 1833 compared to those in opposition was more than 250 to 1.[177] One factor that helps explain this mass mobilization was, of course, the painstaking labor of abolitionist leaders, who traveled throughout Britain to establish anti-slavery societies and to collect evidence of the brutality of slavery.[178] However, there were also larger structural forces at work. As Etlis (1987) explains, while slavery facil-

[174] Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 100-101; Hunt, *Haiti's Influence*, pg. 108.

[175] David Geggus, "Haiti and the Abolitionists: Opinion, Propaganda, and International Politics in Britain and France, 1804-1838," in David Richardson (ed.), *Abolition and its Aftermath: The Historical Context* (New York, NY: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1985), pg. 133.

[176] One widely-recognized theory to explain British abolitionism is the economic decline thesis developed by Eric Williams, but the consensus among historians is that there is little evidence to support this thesis. In essence, Williams argued that colonial plantations had become less economically valuable overtime, and as a result, planters had lost their power in British politics. However, new evidence on the economic state of British colonies decisively show that British plantations were performing at their height around the same time as abolition. For the original thesis, see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). For seminal challenges to the economic decline thesis, see Roger Anstey, *The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810* (Macmillan Press, 1975); Seymour Drescher, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1977); Seymour Drescher and Christine Bolt, *Capitalism and Antislavery* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); and David Etlis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[177] Davis, *Inhuman Bondage*, pg. 246.

[178] Ibid, pg. 239.

itated the growth of consumerism (i.e. consumption based on "want" as opposed to "need"), consumerism required elevating the status of wage labor.[179] Anti-slavery—as opposed to other potential reform movements—was therefore an issue that could unify both employers and workers.[180] Moreover, the grassroots mobilization against slavery was able to translate into policy largely because of the 1832 parliamentary reforms. By redistributing MPs to boroughs with larger populations (and coincidentally, where much of abolitionist mobilization took place), the Great Reforms significantly weakened the West India Lobby's hold on Parliament.[181]

So, British emancipation is best explained by the extensive grassroots mobilization by abolitionists and their ability to pressure Parliament into action after the 1832 Reform Act, but did these campaigns also pressure the British government into recognizing Haiti? There is not much evidence that they did. Chaim Kaufman and Robert Pape show that British abolitionists—particularly those from Protestant Dissenter Sects—did frequently couple ending slavery with other demands for reform and government action; however, recognition of Haiti was not among the policies for which they strongly advocated. Instead, Protestant Dissenters focused primarily on large-scale political reforms like expanding the political franchise and the repeal of disabilities on Catholics and Dissenters (the Tests and Corporation Acts).[182] The most extensive lobbying efforts for Haitian recognition came from the Haitian government itself, which after the abolition of slavery, Lord Palmerston empowered the Foreign Office to respond to their requests.

6.2 Alternative Explanations

Are there other alternative explanations that might account for observed British and U.S. behavior? While the evidence presented in previous sections is consistent with the theoretical proposition that ideological dissimilarity increases the risk of regime disputes and process-tracing suggests clear mechanisms linking these variables together, there may still be concerns that the observed relationship is spurious. In particular, realist scholars have often challenged that what appears to be ideologically-driven behavior is often the pursuit of other material interests in disguise. Below, I assess the extent to which states' alignment via France and economic interests can explain the observed pattern of behaviors.

Because inference in a difference-in-differences design comes from observing divergence in the behavior of interest following assignment to treatment, any proposed explanation must

[179] Etlis, *Economic Growth*, pg. 20.

[180] Davis, Inhuman Bondage, pg. 248. For a collection of works on this issue, see Stanley Engerman, *Terms of Labor: Slavery, Serfdom, and Free Labor* (Stanford University Press, 1999).

[181] Roger Anstey, "Parliamentary Reform, Methodism, and Anti-Slavery Policy, 1829-1833," *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (1981): 209-226; Seymour Drescher, "Public Opinion and the Destruction of British Colonial Slavery," in James Walvin (ed), *Slavery and British Society 1776-1846* (London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1982), pg. 22-48.

[182] Kaufman and Pape, "Explaining Costly Moral Action," pg. 650-653.

be able to account for (1) the observed similarity in outcomes between both units before treatment and (2) the observed dissimilarity in outcomes afterwards. For this case then, potential confounders need to be the same (or relatively similar) for Great Britain and the United States before British emancipation in order to be compelling explanations for why both states chose to diplomatically isolate Haiti. They also need to shift significantly at the same time as British emancipation in a way that we would only expect to affect British behavior.

On these grounds, British and U.S. alignment vis-à-vis France does not appear to be a compelling explanation for their regime dispute with Haiti. At the time Great Britain and the United States chose to isolate Haiti diplomatically, the two states had very different relationships with France. Most notably, Britain and France were at war in 1804 and would continue to be so until the end of 1815. U.S. relations with France, on the other hand, were considerably better, with Jefferson and subsequent Democratic Republican administrations viewing France more favorably than their Federalist counterparts. It is true that by 1804 the party's esteem for France had fallen considerably. Jefferson, for instance, referred to Napoleon on more than one occasion as a "tyrant" and expressed his disappointment that Napoleon had betrayed the democratic ideals of the French Revolution.[183] However, even if Great Britain and the United States shared some degree of anti-French sentiment in common, we would likely expect such sentiment to push both governments to do whatever possible to prevent France's recolonization of Haiti instead of them withholding diplomatic recognition. After all, Haiti had been a tremendous source of power and wealth for the French empire before the Revolution, accounting for about 40% of France's total trade at the time.[184]

Of course, British and U.S. relations with France did shift significantly over the time period under study, but not in a way that can explain the divergence of their foreign policy towards Haiti in 1839. Great Britain enjoyed relatively peaceful relations with France since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The July Revolution in France, which transformed France into a constitutional monarchy more similar to Great Britain, was also a welcome development.[185] Had France not recognized Haiti in 1825, then one might be able to explain Britain's continued isolation of Haiti as a way not to upset the peace with France they had

[183] Shortly before Napoleon's ultimate defeat at Waterloo, for example Jefferson commented that "The unprincipled tyrant of the land is fallen, his power reduced to its original nothingness, his person only not yet in the madhouse, where it ought always to have been." Jefferson to Rodney, March 16th, 1815. Full text available in H.A. Washington (ed.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 6 (New York, NY: Riker, Thorne, & Co, 1855), pg. 448. For more on Thomas Jefferson's opinions of Napoleon, see Joseph Shulim, "Thomas Jefferson Views Napoleon," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (1952), pg. 288-304.

[184] David Geggus, *Slavery, War, and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793-1798* (Oxford University Press, 1982), pg. 1.

[185] Louis Philippe I allied more closely with Britain, compared to the Eastern monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. For an overview of French foreign policy at the time, see Philip Mansel, *Paris Between Empires: Monarchy and Revolution, 1814-1852* (London: Macmillan Press, 2003).

fought hard to establish. However, with French recognition out of the way, it is not clear why it would take over 13 years for Great Britain to follow suit if relations with France were the primary motivator of their behavior.

Moreover, U.S.-French relations had slowly deteriorated since the initial decision to isolate Haiti. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, for instance, was meant to deter renewed French and Spanish conquest in the Americas.[186] With this as a goal of US foreign policy then, we would have expected the United States to do more to prevent France from retaking Haiti, not for it to continue to withhold diplomatic recognition. After all, the United States recognized several former Spanish colonies at the time, including those in Mexico, Chile, and Peru, even though Spain had similarly not yet acknowledged their independence.[187] Furthermore, while the United States did settle a long-standing dispute with France over repayment claims for the seizure of U.S. ships during the Napoleonic Wars in 1835, it is again not obvious how we would expect this to influence its decision to continue withholding diplomatic recognition of Haiti.[188]

Economic interests may help explain some aspects of British and U.S. policy towards Haiti following its independence. In particular, these interests likely illuminate why the two governments allowed informal economic exchange with the island, instead of isolating it entirely. Since the first Industrial Revolution, British economic interests had been deeply tied to the Caribbean as the region was both an important source of Britain's agricultural goods and an important outlet for British manufactured goods.[189] The Napoleonic Wars had also closed many of Britain's main export markets, so manufacturers were eager to find new places to sell their products.[190] Indeed, before abandoning trade negotiations with Dessalines in 1804, Nugent fought to secure a monopoly on trade in manufactured goods for Britain.[191] Trade with Haiti offered similar economic advantages to the United States. Before the Revolution, Haiti was the United States' second largest trading partner, accounting for over 10 percent of total U.S. trade in 1790.[192] Even with the continued collapse of Haiti's plantation economy during the Revolution, the Caribbean nation still offered a dynamic outlet for U.S. goods as European mercantilist policies significantly restricted U.S. trade with the other colonies in the region.[193]

[186] Dexter Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2, (1922), pg. 207-218.

[187] Robertson, "The Recognition of Spanish American Nations," pg. 239-269.

[188] George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pg. 766.

[189] R.C. Nash, "The Organization of Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600-1830," in Peter Coclanis (ed.), *The Atlantic Economy During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice and Personnel* (University of South Carolina Press, 2005), pg. 95-96, 117.

[190] Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica."

[191] Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica," pg. 598.

[192] Brown, *Toussaint's Clause*, pg. 79.

[193] Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations*, pg. 195.

However, it is also important to note that these common economic interests in Haiti cannot fully explain U.S. and British behavior as withholding diplomatic recognition caused both countries received less favorable terms of trade from the Haitian government. Merchants frequently complained to London and Washington of this fact. In 1807, for instance, one British merchant wrote to the office of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies that merely "recognizing [Haiti] as a nation and giving them some consideration and civility" would secure British merchants lucrative concessions from the Haitian government.[194] Similarly, U.S. merchant John Dodge published a series of letters with President Boyer in U.S. newspapers where Boyer indicated that he was willing to offer U.S. merchants lower tariff rates in exchange for diplomatic recognition.[195] In fact, when Great Britain recognized the independence of Mexico and other former Spanish colonies in 1823 but continued to withhold recognition from Haiti, Boyer retaliated by raising import taxes on British goods.[196] Moreover, the continued delay of Haitian recognition until after France acknowledged Haitian independence in 1825 cost Britain and the United States any shot at securing MFN status. So, if Great Britain and the United States were acting solely to maximize their economic gains, then it is difficult to explain their continued policies of non-recognition through 1838 and 1862 respectively.

6.3 Alternative Mechanisms

In all, there does not appear to be strong evidence in support of other mechanisms through which ideological dissimilarity may be working. One alternative mechanism suggests that ideological differences increase the risk of conflict because ideology becomes closely tied to states' alignment preferences during periods of transnational ideological polarization.[197] If this mechanism was at work in this case, then we would expect to observe concerns over Haiti's international alignment as a central cause of disagreement with the United States and Britain. However, it was well understood that Haiti opposed France—the first lines of the Declaration of Independence state the need for Haiti's continued vigilance against the "barbarians who have bloodied our land for two centuries"—but there is no evidence that British or U.S. officials were particularly concerned or opposed to this stance.[198]

There is likewise little evidence to suggest that British and U.S. hostilities stemmed from a fundamental inability to communicate effectively. While British and U.S. officials were skeptical of Haitian pledges of nonintervention, Haitian signaling on these matters were mixed at best. Each one of Haiti's early constitutions enshrined commitments not to instigate slave rebellions abroad, but the 1804 massacres undermined these pledges. Fur-

[194] Pierre, "Liberal Trade," pg. 82

[195] Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations*, pg. 196-197.

[196] Wesley, "The Struggle for Recognition," pg. 371.

[197] Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*, pg. 45-46.

[198] "Haitian Declaration of Independence," January 1st, 1804, CO 137/111, fos. 113-117, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

thermore, Dessalines' refusal to relinquish Haiti's rights to maritime navigation meant that any agreement not to export slave rebellions was not enforceable. So, the evidence is more consistent with the mechanism that suggests ideological cleavages introduce uncertainty over whether states are ideologically-revisionist, rather than a mechanism based on the lack of shared understanding of language and symbols.[199]

Lastly, it is difficult to assess the extent to which more general in-group and out-group dynamics played a role in British and U.S. behavior. One of the key challenges when testing this mechanism is that it is difficult to predict ex-ante why we should expect in-groups versus out-groups to form along ideological lines, as opposed to any other salient cleavage. So, while Great Britain and the United States both clearly did not view Haiti's black leaders as their equals, it is difficult to attribute their designation as an outgroup to ideological difference rather than racial sentiments. I do, however, show that Great Britain's policy towards Haiti changed after emancipation—an ideological shift—even though beliefs in white superiority remained.

7 Conclusion

The relationship between ideology and international conflict has been the subject of a long-standing debate among academics and policymakers alike. For policymakers, understanding how and whether ideological considerations motivate states' behavior in meaningful ways is crucial for determining what – if anything – can be done to encourage peace with ideological others. For academics, these questions are central for understanding the factors that motivate patterns of cooperation and conflict in the international system. There is a growing body evidence demonstrating that across a wide range of time periods and regions, ideologically-disparate states experience regime disputes at higher rates than pairs of states that are ideologically similar.[200] However, we still lack clear evidence that the observed relationship is causal and of the mechanisms responsible for these patterns.

This study sought to address these gaps by comparing British and U.S. foreign policy towards Haiti following its independence in 1804. Adopting a difference-in-differences design, the case provides strong evidence that the ideological threat Haiti posed towards the institution of slavery was the primary source of Britain's and the United States' disputes with the Haitian regime. When Haiti's anti-slavery ideals clashed with Great Britain's and the United States' reliance on the institution, both countries refused to recognize the Haitian regime. However, after Britain ended slavery in its colonies, British and U.S. foreign policy quickly diverged. Great Britain ended its regime dispute with Haiti, while the United States continued in its policies of isolation. Because these states' material interests did not change in a way that can account for this observed policy divergence, we can be more confident that

[199] Haas, *The Ideological Origins* pg. 12-14.

[200] Haas, *The Ideological Origins* Owen, *The Clash of Ideas*; and Hundley, "Ideology and International Conflict."

the resolution of Britain's ideological incompatibility with the Haitian regime is what led it to resolve its regime dispute with the nation as well.

The analysis also reveals important insights into how ideological differences can generate conflict. It clarifies that strong normative commitments for promoting one's ideology abroad are not necessary for ideological differences to create regime disputes between states. Some of the disagreement between those who argue that ideology matters for states' foreign policies and those that tend to be more skeptical stem from different characterizations of how ideological considerations relate to a states' material or security interests. In particular, skeptics tend to treat ideological considerations as purely normative commitments that states pursue at the expense of their other interests.[201] However, in line with recent work, the Haiti case demonstrates that ideological differences can generate conflict by threatening states' domestic stability. Process-tracing reveals that a primary reason why both Great Britain and the United States opposed Haiti was because they feared its example would inspire – or worse, that its leaders would actively promote – the spread of slave rebellions throughout the Caribbean and U.S. south. In this way, the case demonstrates that ideological interests are not completely separate from security interests. Rather, Great Britain's and the United States' ideological incompatibility with Haiti mattered precisely because it lead British and U.S. leaders to view Haiti as a security threat.

Moreover, the analysis highlights the difficulty of credibly signaling non-revisionist preferences, especially among states with conflicting ideological principles. While the case suggests that the threat of demonstration effects from the Haitian example would have likely been enough to cause the regime disputes with Great Britain and the United States, fears that Haitian leaders had ideologically revisionist preferences also featured prominently in decisions to isolate the Caribbean nation. The Haitians did seek to reassure British and U.S. officials that they had had no intentions of becoming "legislators of the Antilles," going as far to include these pledges in their early Constitutions.[202] However, without enforcement mechanisms to limit Haitians' ability to spread or aid slave rebellions, British and U.S. officials did not view these pledges as particularly credible. A reason for this was that British and U.S. officials assessed the Haitians as opportunistic—that is, refraining from exporting slave rebellion when the costs of doing so were high revealed little about the Haitian's intentions to do so if the costs of doing so decreased (for instance, if a large-scale slave uprising did break out in the British colonies or in the United States).[203] Although there is no evidence that Haitian leaders ever attempted to export slave uprisings to the British colonies or U.S. South, it is difficult to assess whether British and U.S. officials were incorrect in their assess-

[201] Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pg. 37-40.

[202] The phrase "legislators of the Antilles" comes from the Haitian Declaration of Independence. See "Haitian Declaration of Independence."

[203] This logic was most apparent in the Governor of Jamaica's and Admiral Hyde Parker's distrust of Toussaint Louverture, even after Louverture betrayed details of a French plot to incite slave rebellion on Jamaica. See Parker to Balcarres, June 30th, 1800; Balcarres to Portland, July 14th, 1799.

ment of Haitian opportunism. In favor of such charges, Haitian President Alexander Petion did secretly provide aid to Simon Bolivar explicitly on the condition that he end slavery in the colonies he liberated.[204]

Taken together, this analysis highlights several areas for future research. While this study focused on evaluating whether and how ideological differences increase the risk of conflict, future research should explore the conditions that mitigate these risks. America's own history with supporting autocratic regimes demonstrates that conflict with ideological competitors is not inevitable. Under what conditions can states sustain cooperation in the face of ideological cleavages, and through which strategies is this cooperation made possible? Further, for scholars interested in signaling, this study suggests that it would be productive to renew inquiries into the challenges of how states might credibly communicate peaceful intentions—a challenge also highlighted in work on the classical security dilemma[205]—as recent work on signaling has focused narrowly on the question of how states can credibly reveal that they are willing to fight over an issue.[206] It also suggests that the potential for states to be opportunistic—rather than simply status quo or revisionist—may complicate to states' abilities to signal peaceful intentions through restraint.[207]

[204]Mohammed Elnaiem, "Bolivar in Haiti," *Jstor Daily*, December 24th, 2019, available at https://daily.jstor.org/bolivar-haiti/.

[205]See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, pg. 58-83.

[206]See James Fearon, "" Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, no. 1 (1997), pg. 68-90; Jessica Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* Vol. 62, no. 1, (2008), pg. 35-64; Kenneth Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, no. 4 (1998), pg. 829-844; Roseanne McManus, *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Danielle Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2020).

[207]For signaling via restraint, see Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust*; Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation."